2012/04/30
Global Policy Shifting From Austerity Toward Growth
2012/01/29
Why the GDP is lying
To see unemployment come down we need to see growth in the 3.5% range, and our next topic will show us why we are not even close to that number.
A Very Soft GDP Number
GDP came in at 2.8% for the 4th quarter of 2011. That is a respectable headline number, given that the US economy only did 1.6% for the whole of last year. For those who look at this number as half full, I offer the following observations. First, examine GDP growth for the last few years. The 4th quarter has been much better than previous quarters, and then GDP dropped off again.
The 2.8% number is softer than it looks. Two-thirds of that growth (1.9%) was from inventory build-up (standard accounting practice says that growth in inventory increases GDP, while sales of inventory reduces it). “Real final sales (GDP less inventory changes) expanded at an anemic 0.8% annual pace in the fourth quarter, a sharp slowdown from the third quarter’s healthy 3.2% rate. That paints a different picture from the apparent pick-up in headline GDP growth from the third-quarter’s 1.8% yearly rate. The difference reflects the shift to inventory building in the fourth quarter from a drawdown in the third quarter.” (Barron’s)
I suppose one could spin inventory growth as businesses being optimistic about future sales and building inventory, but given the weaker retail sales of late (in comparison to previous years) that is rather doubtful. And so all that really happened was a total reversal of inventory sales in the previous quarters. There will be a drawdown of inventories over the next few quarters, which will be a drag on future GDP numbers, much like the pattern we have seen the past few years.
Retail sales growth was not strong. And for the last year, 90%-plus of total retail sales has come from decreased savings, as the savings rate dropped from 4% to 2%. It will be hard to go much lower, so the “boost” we got last year from retail sales accounts for most of the year-over-year growth in GDP. If most of retails sales growth came from reduced savings, that suggests that retail sales will not offer much in the way of growth for the coming year. Just saying.
Further, when calculating real GDP, one subtracts inflation. The Fed prefers an inflation measure called PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures). It is essentially a measure of goods and services targeted toward individuals and consumed by individuals. The number you read in the various media is the CPI or Consumer Price Index. The CPI is inflexible, in that it’s always the same basket of goods. PCE on the other hand, is supposed to take into consideration the notion that if steak is too costly, we’ll eat hamburger. The CPI is typically 0.3-0.5% higher than the PCE, which is convenient if you want the GDP number to look better.
The Fed changed to PCE in February of 2000. The change was buried in the footnotes of the annual Humphrey-Hawkins testimony by then-Fed Chairman Greenspan. So the anemic growth of 1.9% for the last decade would have been even worse if we had used the previous measurement of inflation (CPI). Understand, there is an argument in favor of using PCE, as many academics argue that CPI actually overstates inflation. But there is also an argument to use CPI. It somewhat depends on what you want the final numbers to be.
Fast forward to today, and the year-over-year change of CPI was 2.5%, with the PCE only rising 1.7%. And last quarter was down sharply, to +0.04% on an annual basis. An anomaly of lower energy and commodity costs? Partially, for sure. So if their target rate of inflation is 2%, using PCE gives the Fed grounds for a looser monetary policy.
All in all, GDP was helped by numbers that are not likely to repeat. For a long time I have maintained that the US economy is in a Muddle Through range of around 2%. I remember when last year at this time we had estimates of 4-5% growth for 2011. I looked so bearish. Now, not so much, as 2% would have been better than what we got.
I think we will be lucky to Muddle Through again this year. Mind you, if it was not for a potential shock coming from a serious European crisis and real recession, the US should not slip into outright recession this year.
Source: JohnMauldin.com (http://s.tt/15qYi)
To see unemployment come down we need to see growth in the 3.5% range, and our next topic will show us why we are not even close to that number.
A Very Soft GDP Number
GDP came in at 2.8% for the 4th quarter of 2011. That is a respectable headline number, given that the US economy only did 1.6% for the whole of last year. For those who look at this number as half full, I offer the following observations. First, examine GDP growth for the last few years. The 4th quarter has been much better than previous quarters, and then GDP dropped off again.
The 2.8% number is softer than it looks. Two-thirds of that growth (1.9%) was from inventory build-up (standard accounting practice says that growth in inventory increases GDP, while sales of inventory reduces it). “Real final sales (GDP less inventory changes) expanded at an anemic 0.8% annual pace in the fourth quarter, a sharp slowdown from the third quarter’s healthy 3.2% rate. That paints a different picture from the apparent pick-up in headline GDP growth from the third-quarter’s 1.8% yearly rate. The difference reflects the shift to inventory building in the fourth quarter from a drawdown in the third quarter.” (Barron’s)
I suppose one could spin inventory growth as businesses being optimistic about future sales and building inventory, but given the weaker retail sales of late (in comparison to previous years) that is rather doubtful. And so all that really happened was a total reversal of inventory sales in the previous quarters. There will be a drawdown of inventories over the next few quarters, which will be a drag on future GDP numbers, much like the pattern we have seen the past few years.
Retail sales growth was not strong. And for the last year, 90%-plus of total retail sales has come from decreased savings, as the savings rate dropped from 4% to 2%. It will be hard to go much lower, so the “boost” we got last year from retail sales accounts for most of the year-over-year growth in GDP. If most of retails sales growth came from reduced savings, that suggests that retail sales will not offer much in the way of growth for the coming year. Just saying.
Further, when calculating real GDP, one subtracts inflation. The Fed prefers an inflation measure called PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures). It is essentially a measure of goods and services targeted toward individuals and consumed by individuals. The number you read in the various media is the CPI or Consumer Price Index. The CPI is inflexible, in that it’s always the same basket of goods. PCE on the other hand, is supposed to take into consideration the notion that if steak is too costly, we’ll eat hamburger. The CPI is typically 0.3-0.5% higher than the PCE, which is convenient if you want the GDP number to look better.
The Fed changed to PCE in February of 2000. The change was buried in the footnotes of the annual Humphrey-Hawkins testimony by then-Fed Chairman Greenspan. So the anemic growth of 1.9% for the last decade would have been even worse if we had used the previous measurement of inflation (CPI). Understand, there is an argument in favor of using PCE, as many academics argue that CPI actually overstates inflation. But there is also an argument to use CPI. It somewhat depends on what you want the final numbers to be.
Fast forward to today, and the year-over-year change of CPI was 2.5%, with the PCE only rising 1.7%. And last quarter was down sharply, to +0.04% on an annual basis. An anomaly of lower energy and commodity costs? Partially, for sure. So if their target rate of inflation is 2%, using PCE gives the Fed grounds for a looser monetary policy.
All in all, GDP was helped by numbers that are not likely to repeat. For a long time I have maintained that the US economy is in a Muddle Through range of around 2%. I remember when last year at this time we had estimates of 4-5% growth for 2011. I looked so bearish. Now, not so much, as 2% would have been better than what we got.
I think we will be lucky to Muddle Through again this year. Mind you, if it was not for a potential shock coming from a serious European crisis and real recession, the US should not slip into outright recession this year.
Source: JohnMauldin.com (http://s.tt/15qYi)
The paradox of prosperity
http://www.economist.com/node/21543537
The paradox of prosperity
For China’s rise to continue, the country needs to move away from the model that has served it so well
Jan 28th 2012 | from the print edition
IN THIS issue we launch a weekly section devoted to China. It is the first time since we began our detailed coverage of the United States in 1942 that we have singled out a country in this way. The principal reason is that China is now an economic superpower and is fast becoming a military force capable of unsettling America. But our interest in China lies also in its politics: it is governed by a system that is out of step with global norms. In ways that were never true of post-war Japan and may never be true of India, China will both fascinate and agitate the rest of the world for a long time to come.
Only 20 years ago, China was a long way from being a global superpower. After the protests in Tiananmen Square led to a massacre in 1989, its economic reforms were under threat from conservatives and it faced international isolation. Then in early 1992, like an emperor undertaking a progress, the late Deng Xiaoping set out on a “southern tour” of the most reform-minded provinces. An astonishing endorsement of reform, it was a masterstroke from the man who made modern China. The economy has barely looked back since.
Compared with the rich world’s recent rocky times, China’s progress has been relentless. Yet not far beneath the surface, society is churning. Recent village unrest in Wukan in Guangdong, one province that Deng toured all those years ago; ethnic strife this week in Tibetan areas of Sichuan; the gnawing fear of a house-price crash: all are signs of the centrifugal forces making the Communist Party’s job so hard.
The party’s instinct, born out of all those years of success, is to tighten its grip. So dissidents such as Yu Jie, who alleges he was tortured by security agents and has just left China for America, are harassed. Yet that reflex will make the party’s job harder. It needs instead to master the art of letting go.
China’s third revolution
The argument goes back to Deng’s insight that without economic growth, the Communist Party would be history, like its brethren in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. His reforms replaced a failing political ideology with a new economic legitimacy. The party’s cadres set about remaking China with an energy and single-mindedness that have made some Westerners get in touch with their inner authoritarian. The bureaucrats not only reformed China’s monstrously inefficient state-owned enterprises, but also introduced some meritocracy to appointments.
That mix of political control and market reform has yielded huge benefits. China’s rise over the past two decades has been more impressive than any burst of economic development ever. Annual economic growth has averaged 10% a year and 440m Chinese have lifted themselves out of poverty—the biggest reduction of poverty in history.
Yet for China’s rise to continue, the model cannot remain the same. That’s because China, and the world, are changing.
China is weathering the global crisis well. But to sustain a high growth rate, the economy needs to shift away from investment and exports towards domestic consumption. That transition depends on a fairer division of the spoils of growth. At present, China’s banks shovel workers’ savings into state-owned enterprises, depriving workers of spending power and private companies of capital. As a result, just when some of the other ingredients of China’s boom, such as cheap land and labour, are becoming scarcer, the government is wasting capital on a vast scale. Freeing up the financial system would give consumers more spending power and improve the allocation of capital.
Even today’s modest slowdown is causing unrest (see article). Many people feel that too little of the country’s spectacular growth is trickling down to them. Migrant workers who seek employment in the city are treated as second-class citizens, with poor access to health care and education. Land grabs by local officials are a huge source of anger. Unrestrained industrialisation is poisoning crops and people. Growing corruption is causing fury. And angry people can talk to each other, as they never could before, through the internet.
Party officials cite growing unrest as evidence of the dangers of liberalisation. Migration, they argue, may be a source of growth, but it is also a cause of instability. Workers’ protests disrupt production and threaten prosperity. The stirrings of civil society contain the seeds of chaos. Officials are particularly alive to these dangers in a year in which a new generation of leaders will take power.
That bias towards control is understandable, and not merely self-interested. Patriots can plausibly argue that most people have plenty of space to live as individuals and value stability more than rights and freedoms: the Arab spring, after all, had few echoes in China.
Yet there are rights which Chinese people evidently do want. Migrant workers would like to keep their limited rights to education, health and pensions as they move around the country. And freedom to organise can help, not hinder, the country’s economic rise. Labour unions help industrial peace by discouraging wildcat strikes. Pressure groups can keep a check on corruption. Temples, monasteries, churches and mosques can give prosperous Chinese a motive to help provide welfare. Religious and cultural organisations can offer people meaning to life beyond the insatiable hunger for rapid economic growth.
Our business now
China’s bloody past has taught the Communist Party to fear chaos above all. But history’s other lesson is that those who cling to absolute power end up with none. The paradox, as some within the party are coming to realise, is that for China to succeed it must move away from the formula that has served it so well.
This is a matter of more than intellectual interest to those outside China. Whether the country continues as an authoritarian colossus, stagnates, disintegrates, or, as we would wish, becomes both freer and more prosperous will not just determine China’s future, but shape the rest of the world’s too.
2012/01/24
Europe has three main problems.
Europe has three main problems.
1. A growing number of its countries are insolvent or close to it. It is increasingly likely that the only way forward is for defaults of some type, to lessen the burden of debt to a level where it can be dealt with and that will allow the countries the possibility of growth, which is the only real answer to the problems they face.
2. Because of growing fears of multiple defaults (just Greece would be bad enough!) most of the banks in Europe are seen to be insolvent and in need of hundreds of billions of euros of new capital. The interbank market in Europe is in a shambles, and banks park their cash with the ECB, at a lower rate of return, as that is the only institution they trust. They clearly do not trust each other. As an aside, I heard from many sources while I was Hong Kong and Singapore, meeting with readers and friends, that European banks (especially French) are cutting back on their trade lending, which is making normal commerce more difficult. Didn't we just go through that in 2008?
3. The real problem in Europe is the massive trade imbalances between the peripheral countries and the so-called core countries. Without the ability to adjust currencies, those trade imbalances will render any debt solution moot, as a country cannot balance its budget while it runs a trade deficit and its citizens and businesses also deleverage. I have written about this arithmetic problem on numerous occasions. There must be balance or there must be a mechanism to achieve balance.
One cannot solve one problem without solving all three. Either they all get done or none truly get done. You can kick the can down the road by solving problems 1 and 2, but problem 3 will put you shortly back to square one.
Europe is now trying to address problems 1 and 2. They are talking about a "new treaty" that will require austerity of a real kind, although I understand that Germany has put in a clause that gives it some extra time to achieve its own balanced budget. And the ECB is dispensing euros through the back door to banks, in exchange for anything resembling collateral. Not directly of course, as that is prohibited, but the same thing is being accomplished, despite objections in some quarters, mostly German.
Europe has three main problems.
1. A growing number of its countries are insolvent or close to it. It is increasingly likely that the only way forward is for defaults of some type, to lessen the burden of debt to a level where it can be dealt with and that will allow the countries the possibility of growth, which is the only real answer to the problems they face.
2. Because of growing fears of multiple defaults (just Greece would be bad enough!) most of the banks in Europe are seen to be insolvent and in need of hundreds of billions of euros of new capital. The interbank market in Europe is in a shambles, and banks park their cash with the ECB, at a lower rate of return, as that is the only institution they trust. They clearly do not trust each other. As an aside, I heard from many sources while I was Hong Kong and Singapore, meeting with readers and friends, that European banks (especially French) are cutting back on their trade lending, which is making normal commerce more difficult. Didn't we just go through that in 2008?
3. The real problem in Europe is the massive trade imbalances between the peripheral countries and the so-called core countries. Without the ability to adjust currencies, those trade imbalances will render any debt solution moot, as a country cannot balance its budget while it runs a trade deficit and its citizens and businesses also deleverage. I have written about this arithmetic problem on numerous occasions. There must be balance or there must be a mechanism to achieve balance.
One cannot solve one problem without solving all three. Either they all get done or none truly get done. You can kick the can down the road by solving problems 1 and 2, but problem 3 will put you shortly back to square one.
Europe is now trying to address problems 1 and 2. They are talking about a "new treaty" that will require austerity of a real kind, although I understand that Germany has put in a clause that gives it some extra time to achieve its own balanced budget. And the ECB is dispensing euros through the back door to banks, in exchange for anything resembling collateral. Not directly of course, as that is prohibited, but the same thing is being accomplished, despite objections in some quarters, mostly German.
Source: JohnMauldin.com (http://s.tt/15kJX)
Europe has three main problems.
1. A growing number of its countries are insolvent or close to it. It is increasingly likely that the only way forward is for defaults of some type, to lessen the burden of debt to a level where it can be dealt with and that will allow the countries the possibility of growth, which is the only real answer to the problems they face.
2. Because of growing fears of multiple defaults (just Greece would be bad enough!) most of the banks in Europe are seen to be insolvent and in need of hundreds of billions of euros of new capital. The interbank market in Europe is in a shambles, and banks park their cash with the ECB, at a lower rate of return, as that is the only institution they trust. They clearly do not trust each other. As an aside, I heard from many sources while I was Hong Kong and Singapore, meeting with readers and friends, that European banks (especially French) are cutting back on their trade lending, which is making normal commerce more difficult. Didn't we just go through that in 2008?
3. The real problem in Europe is the massive trade imbalances between the peripheral countries and the so-called core countries. Without the ability to adjust currencies, those trade imbalances will render any debt solution moot, as a country cannot balance its budget while it runs a trade deficit and its citizens and businesses also deleverage. I have written about this arithmetic problem on numerous occasions. There must be balance or there must be a mechanism to achieve balance.
One cannot solve one problem without solving all three. Either they all get done or none truly get done. You can kick the can down the road by solving problems 1 and 2, but problem 3 will put you shortly back to square one.
Europe is now trying to address problems 1 and 2. They are talking about a "new treaty" that will require austerity of a real kind, although I understand that Germany has put in a clause that gives it some extra time to achieve its own balanced budget. And the ECB is dispensing euros through the back door to banks, in exchange for anything resembling collateral. Not directly of course, as that is prohibited, but the same thing is being accomplished, despite objections in some quarters, mostly German.
Source: JohnMauldin.com (http://s.tt/15kJX)
2012/01/08
Paul Tudor Jones Profile
By Jonathan Yates
Counterpunching is the key to success for legendary investor Paul Tudor Jones II, founder of the hedge funds group, Tudor Investment Corporation.
A former welterweight boxing champion in college at the University of Virginia, like any seasoned master of the sweet science, the investment focus of Jones and his funds at Tudor Investment Corporation reflect that there are no big early wins with something as formidable as the financial markets; rather that success emanates from dominating the middle of the ring through macro trading, controlling the corners and developing your best combination of moves to be deployed when the opportunity presents itself from event driven strategies.
In an interview, Jones likened this to playing three dimensional chess, whereas micro trading of one instrument would be chess on one plane. “When trading macro, you never have a complete information set or information edge the way analysts can have when trading individual securities. It’s a helluva lot easier to get an information edge on one stock than it is on the S&P 500,” he observed.
Jones furthered, “When it comes to trading macro, you cannot rely solely on the fundamentals; you have to be a tape reader, which is something of a lost art form. The inability to read a tape and spot trends is also why so many in the relative value space who rely solely on fundamentals have been annihilated in the past decade. Markets have consistently experienced ‘100 year events’ every five years.”
Such an event appeared for Jones in 1987, when he predicted “Black Monday,” tripling his money through short positions when the New York Stock Exchange shed 500 points from the Dow Jones Average on October 19. At the closing bell that afternoon, the Dow was wobbling at 1738.74, a plunge of 22.61 percent (the largest one day drop, except for periods of market closure such as after September 11, 2011). It is estimated that Paul Tudor Jones made about $100 million that day.
Waiting for these opportunities to emerge, Jones invests to control the middle through swing trading. This allows him to limit the exposure of his capital, yet benefit when the financial markets begin to move from external events. Here he invests defensively, trading the smallest amount when the market is the least opportune. To further limit losses and control his trading, he never “averages down,” increasing a position to reduce the price per unit. By decreasing a losing position rather than increasing it through averaging down, his vulnerability to a reversal is never extended. His investment philosophy here is to play great defense, not great offense. For this, he deploys both price stops and time stops.
When the fundamentals turn is when Tudor Jones moves into position, by controlling the corners of the market through very low risk movements, never overexposing his position in the process. When a trade proves to be a winner, it is increased. When a price or time stop is reached, it is closed out, no matter what. Again: offense wins games, defense wins championships.
The recent portfolio of Tudor Jones Group evinces this approach. Most of the stocks added, were large caps (328 in all). These included Cisco, AT&T, Citi, Microsoft, Apache Corporation, Starwood Property Trust, Noble Energy and Peabody Energy. At over seven percent of the portfolio was the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust, the ultimate holding for a macro trader waiting for an opportunity from a turn in the market.
This portfolio is one crafted to react (100 year events happening every 5) in a volatile period of little, if any growth. “I think we’re going into one of those slow or no growth periods in the U.S., which will give us a lot of volatility,” remarked Jones. For this, deeply liquid holdings, such as SPDRs and Microsoft, are imperative. Stocks such as these, blue chips that will maintain value in a little or now growth epoch, pay dividends and allow for massive amounts of capital to be redeployed when an event inevitably arises.
If this period of little or no growth does evolve, as predicted by Tudor Jones, it will not be his first. He started work in the securities industry as a broker for EF Hutton in the late 1970s. From the late 1950s to the early 1980s, the Dow Jones Average was basically flat: it hit a high of 731 for the decade of the ‘50s in 1958 and was still trading in the 700s in the early 1980s. The high for the period of the ‘50s to the early 1980s was 1067, reached on January 11, 1973, before the first Arab oil embargo in October of that year. As a result of the first energy crisis, when OPEC nations quadrupled the price of oil overnight and eventually cut off supplies to the United States in retaliation for the U.S. support of Israel in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hit a low of 570 on December 8, 1974, a plunge of 54.3 percent (adjusted for inflation).
During this span, Jones set up shop in Greenwich, Connecticut with Tudor Investment Corporation in 1980. Profitable from the beginning, he shunned Harvard Business School, as he realized his skill set was something that could not be taught or learned within the confines of ivy covered walls.
He attributes this period, the 1970s, with having the biggest impact on his career. “Trading commodity markets back in the late 1970s, when they were still extraordinarily volatile, allowed me to experience repeated bull and bear markets across a variety of different instruments,” he remembers. Not all of the memories from this time are pleasant, though. He furthered, “Remember, in agricultural markets the cycle the can be just 12 months. I lost my stake a couple of times, which taught me risk control and risk management.”
If the market for the period ahead will be little or no growth, there will be several factors favoring Tudor Investment Corporation. First will be its size. In the past decade, it has had close to $20 billion under management. As Marshal Zhukov, the Russian military strategist from World War II and mastermind of The Battle of Stalingrad noted, “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” Just the sheer mass of funds available to Tudor Investment Corporation will allow it to capitalize on events from which others will be precluded from moving forward due to a basic lack of liquidity.
There is also the fee structure. While the industry standard for hedge funds is two percent per annum of assets under management and twenty percent of profits, Tudor Investment Corporation charges four percent per annum for investing funds and takes twenty three percent of the profits for the house. Clients willing to pay a higher tariff obviously are demonstrating a greater commitment, meaning they will not withdraw their funds in inevitable periods when returns are low (and also resulting in a net worth over $3 billion for Jones, according to Forbes). This will prevent Tudor Investment Corporation from being sucked into the vortex of a death spiral that claimed so many hedge funds during The Great Recession.
Most importantly, is that Paul Tudor Jones, and Tudor Investment Corporation, is preparing for little or no growth, and maximum volatility. Volatility is a trader’s greatest ally and source of largest profits…when the holdings and investment professionals are primed for that eventuality. The composition of the portfolio as structured by Paul Tudor Jones reflects that belief. As a result, Tudor Investment Corporation is “locked and loaded,’ and the powder dry for whatever opportunities come into range and are targeted in the trading days ahead.
http://www.traderslog.com/paul-tudor-jones-profile/
2011/10/02
Bear Market Buying Debunked
http://community.marketsmith.com/telligent/b/blogs/archive/2011/09/29/8097.aspx
The hardest part for investors sitting out during a market correction is their conflicted thoughts about missing potential opportunities. They fear the market will leave them behind, or they want to get back in early. But the impulse to make money by fighting the market’s trend can be costly. In a bear market, two of the biggest temptations for such investors are 1) Dividend-paying stocks (especially in the Dow) and 2) the continued fundamental strength of the prior cycle’s leading stocks. The excessive risk in this environment makes gains on long positions doubtful, but these two “potential opportunities” have even clearer flaws.
First, the problem with dividend stocks in poor market environments is that price depreciation can wipe out gains made from the dividends. See the net losses on the top 7 well known dividend paying stocks in the table below.
|
| Dividend | Relative Strength | Price Chg | Net |
| FTR | 12.3 | 26 | -37.00 | -24.70 |
| LEG | 5.6 | 49 | -11.29 | -5.69 |
| HPQ | 2.0 | 10 | -43.97 | -41.97 |
| DD | 4.0 | 38 | - 15.28 | -11.28 |
| GE | 3.8 | 47 | -15.53 | -11.73 |
| CAT | 2.5 | 32 | -17.07 | -14.57 |
| CSCO | 1.5 | 61 | - 20.80 | -19.30 |
| KFT | 3.4 | 88 | 8.63 | 12.03 |
| MCD | 3.2 | 92 | 14.68 | 17.48 |
| IBM | 1.7 | 94 | 20.98 | 22.68 |
Relative Strength (RS Rating) is usually more relevant to overall gains in stocks than dividend yields (KFT, MCD and IBM in the table above). If you have to own dividend paying stocks now, the high RS stocks are the ones you want to own, because by definition they are holding up the best. If you are tempted to buy solely because the dividend looks attractive, you may be taking on more risk than you realize. Remember a position in cash isn’t yielding anything, but at least you are not going backwards.
The other temptation stems from the fact that the fundamental stories that propelled the leading growth stocks of the last bull cycle are still intact. “Buy them now while they are cheaper” has been said about stocks like GMCR, CMG, PCLN, LULU, and AAPL. While the fundamentals continue to be impressive for these leaders, the problem with buying them now is that you are guessing that the market has bottomed here. Without confirming that a new uptrend has begun by consulting your stock charts, these stocks and the market could very well continue lower.
To soften the severity of the market’s weakness, many would like to write off the action of the leading stocks as simply “an overreaction by momentum stocks.” But why all of a sudden are these stocks being labeled as “momentum”? Investors should recognize that these stocks are some of the leading growth stocks since the market uptrend began in March of 2009. All have formed late stage bases and are vulnerable to topping. Most breakouts have failed and have, or are about to undercut the lows of their most recent base. In the end, strong fundamentals are not enough to fend off the topping cycle all stocks eventually go through. From our decades of studying the behavior of leading stocks, we know that leading growth stocks will correct, on average, 72% from peak to trough. We also know that only 12% will recover and reassert themselves in the next bull cycle. But more importantly, we know that those leaders are an indicator for where the market is probably going next. And right now, there is a higher probability that we are heading lower.
Even AAPL, with some of the best fundamentals out there, will probably get hit if the market keeps sliding lower. Don’t get me wrong, I love AAPL. I own a Mac, an iPad, an iPhone, and an iTunes library full of music. But when the tide drops, it lowers all boats—even that beautiful yacht that everyone wishes was theirs. Admittedly, there may be one to two stocks, or and industry group, that rises during a bear market. But the risk you will take on, and the losses you will incur on the other stocks you buy in trying the find “the one,” will most likely make the entire endeavor of buying stocks unprofitable (until a new market uptrend has begun).
I can even talk up a stock like BIDU, but the same fact still applies. The stock gapped down through its 200-day moving average, and after today (9/29) is now another 10% lower. At least for now, the stock has topped. There is a one in eight chance that it consolidates the price depreciation and sets up to go again in the next bull market. So for now all you can do is sit and watch. Maybe it will, maybe it won’t.
A good example of a terrible stock to be tempted to buy right now is NFLX. Unlike the other leaders mentioned above, this one has had a major negative change to its fundamental story over the last few months. However it continues to be a topic of discussion among investors now because of its merger/partnership rumors with companies like AMZN or Facebook, or content deals with companies like DWA. Given the huge risk in this market and in this stock in particular, why would anyone place a bet on a single event that may or may not occur? That isn’t investing, it’s gambling.
Hopefully most investors won’t have to sift through the endless options and “debunk” each opportunity that comes along while the market is in this correction. The fact that the trend is down should be enough to keep them out.
2011/08/26
2011/08/16
Immelt Vs. Welch
By GARY M. STERN, FOR INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY
Posted 08/12/2011 04:08 PM ET
Winning was everything to Jack Welch. The CEO of General Electric (GE) from 1981 to 2001 described his main mission in his best-selling "Winning" as making GE "the most competitive enterprise in the world by being No. 1 and 2 in every market." Businesses that weren't No. 1 or 2 were fixed, sold or discarded.
Being the dominant business in many markets boosted GE's financial performance. Under Welch, GE's revenue rose from $26.8 billion in 1981 to $130 billion in 2001. Its market cap skyrocketed from $12 billion to $280 billion. Welch was a winner.
Under successor Jeffrey Immelt, GE's faced tougher times, slashing its dividend and seeing its share price falter. How does Immelt's management style differ from Welch's? And is GE ripe to regain its mojo?
Immelt, Welch's successor since 2001, has faced a tougher road boosting GE's revenue and share price. When Immelt assumed the mantle, GE's stock sold for $40 a share. But earlier this year, its stock hovered under $20, about half of what it was under Welch.
Immelt's modified some of Welch's precepts about making every business a leader, says Daniel Holland, an equities analyst at Morningstar in Chicago, who covers GE. Immelt has strengthened its business in energy, health care and aerospace markets but avoided selling off many less-than-stellar businesses.
Different Managing Styles
Holland describes Immelt's management style as "more collaborative" than Welch's. GE's senior managers describe Immelt as "more approachable at working out issues and getting everyone involved" to find solutions, Holland says. Welch solved problems by obtaining data and making executive decisions.
Welch created a Darwinian culture where the strong thrived and the weakest performers fell by the wayside. He urged managers to separate employees into the top 20, middle 70 and bottom 10, identify and cultivate staff who had the skills to become leaders, and ax the bottom 10%.
But GE paid a price for slashing the bottom rung of performers. When GE cut 10% of its senior execs, many "valuable assets were walking out the door," Holland said. Immelt has been more tolerant, giving senior execs time to develop, halting the talent drain.
One reason GE stock nose-dived under Immelt was its lofty valuation of 60 times earnings couldn't be sustained. Since most industrial conglomerates are valued at 15 to 20 times earnings, GE returned to earth by 2011, trading until the recent market tumult at about 15 times earnings.
Under Welch, GE Capital was a money dynamo, generating about 40% of revenue. By overly relying on GE Capital, it "began to look more like a financial than an industrial firm," Holland said. Moreover, its commercial real-estate portfolio plunged during the financial crisis.
Immelt's New Recipe
Immelt developed a more balanced approach. In 2010 GE's profit depended on five major businesses: GE Technology Infrastructure, providing 39% of profit; GE Energy Infrastructure 35%; NBC Universal 12%; GE Capital 12%; and GE Consumer & Industrial 2%. Immelt sold off GE Plastics to Saudi Basic Industries for $11.6 billion in 2007. He also sold the troubled subprime mortgage business in 2007, cutting GE's losses.
GE's portfolio of diversified businesses should sustain steady profits and be less susceptible to downturns. Holland said, "Energy infrastructure forms the backbone of the firm's growth." That strategy should produce continued profits as the U.S. downplays reliance on coal and turns to natural gas, wind turbines and solar. Energy products take advantage of GE's strengths: global scale, service and highly engineered products.
Ill-Timed Coronation
Immelt was jinxed from the minute he was named to replace Welch on Sept. 7, 2001. Four days later, 9/11 happened, the stock market dipped and GE's insurance business lost $600 million in a day, notes David Magee, author of "Jeff Immelt and the New GE Way." Immelt has endured 9/11, a deep recession and still managed to turn around GE's business mix.
Change and evolution are the cornerstones of Immelt's management style. Immelt's most strategic decision at GE was "remaking the business," Magee said. Immelt inherited businesses like appliances and plastics, which were fading, and GE Capital, which was on the downswing.
Immelt invested heavily in R&D, acquired a wind business from Enron for a minimal amount, which turned into a multibillion-dollar business, and began to transform GE.
Magee faults Immelt for not saying five years ago that GE wasn't going to rebound quickly and needed a major overhaul. Nonetheless, Magee gives Immelt credit for redirecting "mature businesses that were worn out and changing GE into a 21st century company."
GE is showing signs of bouncing back. Until this month's stock market tumble, GE's share price had spiked 26% over the last year vs. a 23% rise in the Dow Jones industrial average. To keep the momentum going, Immelt must show "increased revenue and organic growth," Magee said.
Holland expects GE to produce "single-digit revenue growth over the next four years in GE's industrial business and improved results in health care, transportation and GE Capital." If those businesses prosper, Immelt could take a page out of Welch's playbook and start a new winning streak for GE.
2011/08/13
2011/08/11
Philip Carret, A Pioneer Of Fund Gains
Posted 02:01 PM ET
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article/580997/201108101401/Philip-Carret-A-Pioneer-Of-Fund-Gains.aspx
It's probably not easy to impress the megawealthy Warren Buffett.
Philip Carret was an exception.
Buffett looked to Carret as a role model, comparing his fellow investor and longtime friend to one of baseball's all-time greats.
He called him "the Lou Gehrig of investing" and said Carret had the "best long-term investment record of anyone I know."
Carret created the Pioneer Fund, one of the first stock mutual funds, in 1928 with $25,000 from friends and family. Today the global firm, called Pioneer Investments, manages a number of funds that total $250 billion in assets.
The Pioneer Fund, itself with $6 billion in assets, recently reached a rich milestone. It's had a cumulative return of 1,000,000% from its founding through Dec. 31. A dollar invested in 1928 would be worth more than $1 million today.
Carret (1896-1998) was born in Lynn, Mass., and was the only child of a lawyer father and social-worker mother. Although his Harvard-trained dad had a good income, Carret recalled his parents weren't very adept at managing money.
In "A Money Mind at 90"— a book he wrote at 90 years old — he said when he was 16 he saw that "If I were ever to gain wealth, it would have to be by my own efforts."
Head Game
Carret believed that a person could learn to manage money well while developing a "money mind."
Although his parents didn't seem to possess much of this quality, he saw it in his grandfather Joseph, who Carret jokingly said found his fortune in "the thriving little metropolis of New York City."
Twenty years after Joseph began working, he had put aside enough capital to buy a sugar plantation in Cuba. He spent the rest of his life there. In good years, Carret wrote, the plantation yielded $25,000, "a princely sum at the time."
Carret thought science might be his path to wealth. So, he took the entrance exam to Harvard, was admitted at 16 and earned a bachelor's degree in chemistry.
An avid reader, he excelled at Harvard. He was socially shy, but he made some good friends while there. As for social clubs, he turned one down when it asked him to do something he found anathema — "that I ditch my Jewish roommate. To reach a decision took no time at all. Until we graduated, David and I roomed together in harmony and friendship."
After college he joined the Army Signal Corps — a forerunner to the Air Force — and learned to fly a Sopwith Camel.
With World War I raging in Europe, the Army sent him to France; the war ended in 1918 before he saw combat.
Leaving the service, he got a job as a reporter for Barron's weekly business newspaper. And in 1924 he began investing money for family and friends who saw that he had a knack for finding winning stocks.
He learned how to pick and hold stocks by reading about and studying the market, says Pioneer Fund manager John Carey, who took the reins from Carret 25 years ago.
"Phil read a great deal. He read history and political works and economic works. He kept up with the news," Carey told IBD. "If you went to his office, you would see piles of reading material."
One thing Carret learned early in his reading was how to advance by doing the straightforward.
"He read a book called 'Obvious Adams,' about an advertising agent who made his living advertising the obvious," said Carey. "For example, the agent was hired by a brown sugar company to promote its product. He went to stores and found brown sugar didn't come in a brown box. He told the company to switch to brown boxes, and their sales doubled in a year and then tripled the next year."
Bliss
Carret wrote that a cornerstone of his success was his lifelong partnership with his wife, Betty: "In the most important aspect of my life — marriage and family — I was exceptionally fortunate. Almost from the day I met Betty — in November 1920 — until the day of her death 65 years later, we enjoyed a supremely happy relationship."
He also drew strength from his friendship with the Rev. Norman Vincent Peale, author of "The Power of Positive Thinking."
That best-seller "encapsulates Phil Carret's approach to investing," Carey said. "He was always open and looking for opportunity.
"Phil once said, 'There's never been a great fortune built in the U.S. by a bet on catastrophe.' He was thinking about Thomas Edison and J.D. Rockefeller and people who built enterprises and employed people, making goods that were useful to people."
Carret himself inspired many other people. Among them was Jack Kenney, former CEO of Western Reserve Life Assurance, now part of Aegon.
Kenney worked alongside Carret in the 1960s and '70s. They paired stock funds and insurance policies to create hybrid investments.
"He had what I would call the greatest integrity of any person I've met," Kenney said. "He inspired me. I started my own mutual fund in '85 and tried to emulate the way he managed money."
Carret's investing strategy involved buying high-quality, underpriced stocks and holding them for the long term.
Carret's love of learning helped him acquire a deep understanding of markets, said Kenney: "He was an amazing individual. Often we at Western Life would look at a stock and we didn't think much of it, but he did. In most cases it turned out to be a winner."
In 1963, Carret sold Pioneer and founded Carret & Co. (now Brean Murray, Carret & Co.), an investment portfolio manager. In 1988, he sold his stake in Carret & Co., but continued to work there three days a week without salary. He also remained on Pioneer's board until his 100th birthday in 1996. In the preface to "Money Mind" he said, "If I've contributed even an infinitesimal bit to the welfare of society, my life has not been in vain."
Carret began celebrating his 100th birthday when he was 90. By the time he reached the century mark, he'd had several birthday parties to mark the occasion.
For his 100th, he appeared on TV's "Today" show.
According to Kenney, Carret told the show's host: "I attribute my longevity to three things. No. 1, I eat my meat very rare. Two, I drink my bourbon very strong. Three, if I get the urge to exercise, I lie down."
Carret died two years later, soon before his 102nd birthday.
2011/08/05
Thriving Long Term in the Stock Market
http://community.marketsmith.com/telligent/b/blogs/archive/2011/08/04/7371.aspx
Much of the recent commentary from experienced Wall Street professionals more or less promotes buying into stock market dips as the right investing approach for handling the current market. My problem with this approach is that, by definition, an investor is buying into a downtrend. Any purchase larger than a small add to a solidly profitable, existing position carries with it high risk. Best case, the investor buying on a dip will make a few extra percentage points on those stocks that snap back. But sometimes stocks don’t bounce back right away—or at all. Sometimes, a dip becomes a drop. And where a drop ultimately ends up is anyone’s guess.
The real issue is: what level of risk are investors taking by buying into a downtrend? Unfortunately, the allure of buying their favorite stock cheaper makes many investors gloss over risk assessment. The stock market is inherently a risky venture. We are risking capital to make money. That very fact should keep risk assessment front and center, but strangely enough when the market is at its riskiest, few assess their true risk.
There are countless rationalizations for downplaying risk. But this one should cut through them all. No one, including the investment legends of the last century, can consistently call market bottoms and tops. Nor can they consistently predict at which point a stock will stop going down. In the 1998-1999 stock market, analysts were continually upgrading their price targets on stocks and recommending investors buy them on the dips. We all know the bubble’s outcome. The old adage “try to catch a falling knife” comes to mind: Nortel Networks topped at 86 in July 2000, a year later it was around $8.00 per share; it went bankrupt in 2009. Nokia topped at 62.50 in June 2000, a year later it was hovering in the mid 20s and is currently around $5 per share. These were both great companies that had outstanding fundamentals. An interesting but little-known fact: When a great, winning stock finally tops, the number of stockholders typically increases as it drops all the way back down.
Yes, this market will eventually go back into an uptrend, next week, next month, or next year. Who knows? But ask yourself: what is my risk-reward ratio in buying and owning stocks right now—so late in the cycle, not to mention all the volatility—versus owning stocks in a clear uptrend?
There are correct times to enter a position and many more incorrect times to enter one. This is why investors should consult a stock chart before making an investment decision. A chart is factual and removes all outside chatter. It also gives investors context and a perspective from which to better gauge the risk of entry at that particular time. We want to buy right, not cheap. We also want to sell right. Charts help investors do both, more consistently.
But you’re still thinking, “I don’t want to miss the upturn, so I’ll hold my best stocks now and endure the pain.” This was the prevailing thought among most investors in 2000-2002 and in the first part of 2008. I don’t think this correction, should it continue, will be nearly as devastating as those two downtrends, but we are in a downtrend now. And no one is smart enough to know how long it will last or how low the market will go. What we do know by consulting stock charts of the major indexes is that the market is not acting right. And fighting a downtrend can be costly.
As of this writing, I am watching the dozen best, strongest leaders resist this downtrend. They all have phenomenal earnings and sales. Their stories are compelling. However, when the tide is dropping all boats sink. Even that beautiful yacht for sale that everyone wants to own.
In a topping process, the very best stocks do hold up to the last. Unfortunately, that shred of hope—coupled with the market’s cunning ability to appear just good enough to invest in—keeps us interested and owning stocks. Many investors get so focused on the profit side they forget that defense always comes first when dealing with a market that, in the end, always tops all stocks.
As in life, patience (with a good dose of perspective) helps keep difficult situations from turning into despairing ones. Right now, patience is an investor’s best friend.
