The paradox of prosperity

http://www.economist.com/node/21543537

The paradox of prosperity

For China’s rise to continue, the country needs to move away from the model that has served it so well

Jan 28th 2012 | from the print edition

IN THIS issue we launch a weekly section devoted to China. It is the first time since we began our detailed coverage of the United States in 1942 that we have singled out a country in this way. The principal reason is that China is now an economic superpower and is fast becoming a military force capable of unsettling America. But our interest in China lies also in its politics: it is governed by a system that is out of step with global norms. In ways that were never true of post-war Japan and may never be true of India, China will both fascinate and agitate the rest of the world for a long time to come.

Only 20 years ago, China was a long way from being a global superpower. After the protests in Tiananmen Square led to a massacre in 1989, its economic reforms were under threat from conservatives and it faced international isolation. Then in early 1992, like an emperor undertaking a progress, the late Deng Xiaoping set out on a “southern tour” of the most reform-minded provinces. An astonishing endorsement of reform, it was a masterstroke from the man who made modern China. The economy has barely looked back since.

Compared with the rich world’s recent rocky times, China’s progress has been relentless. Yet not far beneath the surface, society is churning. Recent village unrest in Wukan in Guangdong, one province that Deng toured all those years ago; ethnic strife this week in Tibetan areas of Sichuan; the gnawing fear of a house-price crash: all are signs of the centrifugal forces making the Communist Party’s job so hard.

The party’s instinct, born out of all those years of success, is to tighten its grip. So dissidents such as Yu Jie, who alleges he was tortured by security agents and has just left China for America, are harassed. Yet that reflex will make the party’s job harder. It needs instead to master the art of letting go.

China’s third revolution

The argument goes back to Deng’s insight that without economic growth, the Communist Party would be history, like its brethren in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. His reforms replaced a failing political ideology with a new economic legitimacy. The party’s cadres set about remaking China with an energy and single-mindedness that have made some Westerners get in touch with their inner authoritarian. The bureaucrats not only reformed China’s monstrously inefficient state-owned enterprises, but also introduced some meritocracy to appointments.

That mix of political control and market reform has yielded huge benefits. China’s rise over the past two decades has been more impressive than any burst of economic development ever. Annual economic growth has averaged 10% a year and 440m Chinese have lifted themselves out of poverty—the biggest reduction of poverty in history.

Yet for China’s rise to continue, the model cannot remain the same. That’s because China, and the world, are changing.

China is weathering the global crisis well. But to sustain a high growth rate, the economy needs to shift away from investment and exports towards domestic consumption. That transition depends on a fairer division of the spoils of growth. At present, China’s banks shovel workers’ savings into state-owned enterprises, depriving workers of spending power and private companies of capital. As a result, just when some of the other ingredients of China’s boom, such as cheap land and labour, are becoming scarcer, the government is wasting capital on a vast scale. Freeing up the financial system would give consumers more spending power and improve the allocation of capital.

Even today’s modest slowdown is causing unrest (see article). Many people feel that too little of the country’s spectacular growth is trickling down to them. Migrant workers who seek employment in the city are treated as second-class citizens, with poor access to health care and education. Land grabs by local officials are a huge source of anger. Unrestrained industrialisation is poisoning crops and people. Growing corruption is causing fury. And angry people can talk to each other, as they never could before, through the internet.

Party officials cite growing unrest as evidence of the dangers of liberalisation. Migration, they argue, may be a source of growth, but it is also a cause of instability. Workers’ protests disrupt production and threaten prosperity. The stirrings of civil society contain the seeds of chaos. Officials are particularly alive to these dangers in a year in which a new generation of leaders will take power.

That bias towards control is understandable, and not merely self-interested. Patriots can plausibly argue that most people have plenty of space to live as individuals and value stability more than rights and freedoms: the Arab spring, after all, had few echoes in China.

Yet there are rights which Chinese people evidently do want. Migrant workers would like to keep their limited rights to education, health and pensions as they move around the country. And freedom to organise can help, not hinder, the country’s economic rise. Labour unions help industrial peace by discouraging wildcat strikes. Pressure groups can keep a check on corruption. Temples, monasteries, churches and mosques can give prosperous Chinese a motive to help provide welfare. Religious and cultural organisations can offer people meaning to life beyond the insatiable hunger for rapid economic growth.

Our business now

China’s bloody past has taught the Communist Party to fear chaos above all. But history’s other lesson is that those who cling to absolute power end up with none. The paradox, as some within the party are coming to realise, is that for China to succeed it must move away from the formula that has served it so well.

This is a matter of more than intellectual interest to those outside China. Whether the country continues as an authoritarian colossus, stagnates, disintegrates, or, as we would wish, becomes both freer and more prosperous will not just determine China’s future, but shape the rest of the world’s too.

Bursting China's bubble

http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/China-inflation-interest-rates-banks-bubble-subpri-pd20110111-CYU2E

Who has survived the global credit crisis in the best shape? As Zhou Enlai is reputed to have said about the impact of the French Revolution, it is still too early to judge. The snap verdict that China is the big winner and the US and rest of the old Group of Seven big losers is already looking questionable.

True, China has continued to register turbo-charged growth while many of the debt-laden economies of the west have struggled. No surprise, then, that a tsunami of financial capital has surged eastwards, or that European politicians are scrabbling for trade deals, despite China’s extraordinarily aggressive posture over the Nobel peace prize and other diplomatic issues.

The financial markets, however, have taken a rather different view. The Shanghai market is at less than half its all-time high, significantly underperforming the other three members of the Bric group. More surprising, since the start of the US subprime crisis in August 2007, Shanghai’s total return in dollars has been beaten by the American S&P500, the UK’s FTSE100, and even the Japanese Topix.

The message is clear. The China story that has been sold so skilfully all over the world is simply another version of the “new era” thinking that has characterised every investment mania from the South Sea bubble to the dotcom frenzy.

After the extended period of disappointing performance, Chinese shares no longer look so expensive in terms of the current price to earnings ratio. But this may be deceptive. On the cyclically adjusted “Shiller PE” – which uses a 10-year average of earnings – the China market is even now almost as expensive as the US stock market was in 1929. In other words, the current level of Chinese earnings is high and probably unsustainable.

There are good grounds for concern about the future. A significant increase in the profit share of national income, as we have seen in China this century, implies a significant decrease in the labour share – meaning that wages fail to keep up with economic growth. The other side of this is apparent in the gross domestic product numbers – a decline in the contribution of consumption and a ballooning dependence on investment. The longer these trends continue, the greater the ultimate reversal.

We’ve seen this movie before – 40 years ago, to be exact. In the 1960s Japan was achieving year upon year of double-digit GDP growth, fuelled by government-directed investment into infrastructure projects such as the bullet-train network and the build-up of heavy industry. Throughout this period, workers were flooding into the cities from the countryside, depressing wages and setting off a virtuous cycle of rising profitability and rising investment.

In the mid-1950s, Japanese labour had taken 60 per cent of total value added. In the miracle years this ratio fell to 50 per cent, then started a V-shaped recovery in 1970 as the labour market tightened. Ten years later it had soared to a plateau of 68 per cent. These gains had to be fought for. In the 1970s, Japan’s now dormant union movement was in its heyday. Profit margins were squeezed, and in real terms the stock market went nowhere for a decade.

Can workers grab a bigger share of the economic pie before the urbanisation process is complete? In Japan they did. In 1970 Japan’s urbanisation ratio (the proportion of urban population to total population) was still just 53 per cent. Currently the Chinese urbanisation ratio is 45 per cent, roughly where Japan was in 1964. However, Chinese statistics are notoriously unreliable. The floating population of unregistered urban migrants is estimated at between 50m and 140m people. So China’s true urbanisation ratio may already be close to Japan’s in 1970.

If China were to follow Japan, the next stage would be labour strife and inflation. The best way to avoid that outcome would be a radical tightening of the current super-easy monetary policy. But that would risk a serious slowdown and probably necessitate a large revaluation of the renminbi – both anathema to Beijing. Meanwhile, China’s reliance on a cheap currency is helping to fuel a trade war, in the words of the Brazilian finance minister.

There is no good way out of the corner into which China has painted itself. Rebalancing the economy is absolutely necessary. It is also a long-term project fraught with risks for China’s rulers – and for investors who have bought the story of inevitable western decline and unstoppable Chinese ascent.

The writer is is a Tokyo-based analyst with Arcus Research

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011

Jim Walker on Euro and Yuan

Shrewd as Serpents

http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article24079.html
By Victor Chan Wai-To

Everyone has heard about the Prisoners' Dilemma before, I suppose. For those who don't know, here is the gist: It is about a situation between two players that if they cooperate, they will get the biggest benefit. However, if one decides to cooperate yet get betrayed later, he will suffer more than if he simply betrayed the other guy in the first place. Logically, the two players should simply cooperate, but sometimes when you are uncertain about the other player's sincerity, the situation becomes tricky.

This is certainly a good analogy between China and the US. If they can work together, both sides are likely to win and bring the world out of the financial mess. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be true, because right from the start both sides had adopted a mindset recovering at the expense of the other.

You have to admire the shrewdness of the US in international politics. After the meltdown of Lehmann in 2008, they were in a liquidity squeeze and an urgent need for liquidity, but they did not want to print all the necessary cashflow by themselves, for otherwise it would damage their financial credibility too much. Therefore, they thought of a way to get others to print money for them: they pretended to be going bankrupt soon, and urged the world to do something to save them.

And they successfully enticed China, who held the most US debts and feared all the debts would turned bad. It reminded us the saying, "if you owe $1000, you worry; but if you owe $100b, the bank worry." Convinced for a potnetial default, China launched a huge rescue plan and bumped 10T of Yuan (about USD 1.4T at that time) into their economy. Only then, the US slowly carried out their stimulus package much later, and it was only worth USD 0.8T.

At that time the US were blamed for acting slow and China was the hero, but the savior one year ago is now the source of all asset bubbles and inflations, as well as the "evil" currency manipulator. On the other hand, the US economy is still the most resilient in the world, and no one seems to be accusing the Fed and other US financial firms for doing similar things for the dollar.

And here is the latest episode of the US-China drama: QE2. It's effectiveness as an economic stimulus has been questioned by many, as economist Joseph Stiglitz has argued that what the US need are real policies that stimulate the economy. He pointed out that printing money will not only re-created the housing bubbles and bank regulation problems in the US, but also hurt the Sino-American relation.

The problem is, the US are not very keen in making friends with China. Their main concern is how to keep the inflation going in the emerging markets, so that the competitive advantages of the emerging markets will get neutralized to a very large extent. Bernanke made it obvious that combating deflation is now his first priority. Employment? Perhaps we will come to that sooner or later.

Of course the emerging markets are not dumb either. For example, other than China, Korea had also taken actions to blockade foreign cashflows. However, this alone is not enough to counter against the US, because the US has another dreadful weapon - rising material price.

There were several attempts in history to change the pricing of oil into other currencies, and they all failed inevitably, because that they are challenging America's direct control of the oil price, and the US had defended this pricing tradition at all cost. The printing of the dollar has another effect: it pushes the price of the commodities so high that, along with inflation, it increases to cost of productions in emerging markets. This is a much more difficult threat for the emerging markets to fend off.

In the international world, it is my impression that almost over a half of the present problems can be resolved if the US and China come to a deal. I believe any trader or investor would benefit a lot if they pay close attention to the duels between these two giants in the world.

Jim Rogers on China's rate hike

When Will China Move on the Yuan?

Europe’s Debt Crisis Is Casting a Shadow Over China

From: http://www.cnbc.com/id/37189729

The pain of the European debt crisis is spreading, with the plummeting euro making Chinese companies less competitive in Europe, their largest market, and complicating any move to break the Chinese currency’s peg to the dollar.

Chinese policy makers reached a consensus last month about breaking the dollar peg. But allowing the renminbi, which is also known as the yuan, to rise against the dollar now would mean a further increase in the renminbi’s level against the euro, creating even more problems for Chinese exporters to Europe.

The euro has plunged against the renminbi in recent weeks, at one point Monday reaching its lowest level since late 2002.

The steep rise of the renminbi prompted a Commerce Ministry official in Beijing to warn Monday that China’s exports could be threatened. The official’s comments, the most explicit yet on the implications for China of Europe’s recent financial difficulties, suggest that even the world's fastest-growing major economy, and increasingly the engine of global growth, is not immune to the crisis that started in Greece and threatens to spread across much of Europe.

“The yuan has risen about 14.5 percent against the euro during the past four months, which will increase cost pressure for Chinese exporters and also have a negative impact on China’s exports to European countries,” Yao Jian, the ministry’s spokesman, said at a news conference in Beijing, according to news services.

Some economists warn that there may be much worse to come. The biggest reason why Chinese exports plunged early last year was not weakening demand in industrialized countries but a sudden, temporary disappearance of trade finance. The availability of trade finance could easily become a serious problem again soon, said Dong Tao, the chief Asia economist at Credit Suisse.

Chinese exporters rely very heavily on bank letters of credit to finance their shipments. The availability of the letters of credit is closely linked to overnight lending rates between banks. When banks have trouble borrowing money themselves, they tend to cut sharply the issuance of letters of credit for trade finance as a quick, easy way to conserve cash without violating the terms of other financial obligations, like established lines of credit for big corporations.

Interbank lending rates surged late last week and on Monday and must now come back down very quickly to persuade banks to keep issuing letters of credit, Mr. Tao said. “Without trade finance, trade won’t happen,” he said.

The Shanghai stock market plunged Monday, with the composite index falling 5.1 percent on worries about global demand as well as concerns about possible further moves in China to limit a steep rise in real estate prices this spring.

Some Chinese companies are already running into difficulty because of the euro’s fall against the renminbi.

“We have been receiving calls from some European clients who signed contracts with us earlier this month, and they all want to cancel their orders, since the depreciation of the euro has eroded all their margins and then some,” said Elvin Xu, the sales manager of Guangdong Ouyi Electrical Appliance in Zhongshan, China, which makes gas stoves, heaters and water heaters.

“They say they cannot increase the prices at their end to their customers, given intense competition in their marketplace,” Mr. Xu added.

The renminbi is rising along with the dollar against the euro. The Chinese government has continued to intervene heavily in currency markets in recent weeks to prevent the renminbi from rising against the dollar, maintaining an informal peg of 6.827 renminbi to the dollar, the level since July 2008.

Because American companies in particular compete in the Chinese market with European companies in many industries, the euro’s weakness against the renminbi is putting American companies at a disadvantage just as Gary Locke, the U.S. commerce secretary, is leading the first cabinet-level trade mission of the administration of President Barack Obama to China this week.

Mr. Locke said Monday in Hong Kong that Mr. Obama’s goal was to double American exports by 2015. Short-term currency fluctuations do not detract from that goal, he said, adding, “Who knows what the euro will be next month, six months from now or a year from now?”

Steve Jennings, one of the American executives traveling with Mr. Locke, said that the weakness of the euro would help European companies compete against U.S. companies in export markets all over the world.

“As the euro continues to decline, they’re going to have some advantages,” said Mr. Jennings, the chief marketing officer of BPL Global, a company based in Oregon that manufactures electricity monitoring equipment.

Chinese leaders reached a consensus in April to break the renminbi’s peg to the dollar, ending a dispute that spilled into public view in March when Commerce Ministry officials warned in speeches and interviews in Beijing and Washington about the dangers of any change in the renminbi’s value. The ministry halted those warnings immediately after the consensus was reached, and Chen Deming, the commerce minister, even reversed himself publicly by saying that China’s trade deficit in March was nothing to worry about.

But events since then have delayed implementation of the consensus, including public attention paid to a visit to Beijing by the U.S. Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, followed by the Qinghai earthquake and then the euro’s slide.

The euro’s difficulties have also inflicted tens of billions of dollars in losses on the value of China’s $2.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, according to Western economists. China had been trying to limit its dependence on U.S. Treasury securities for those reserves in recent years, fearing that the United States might someday suffer from budget problems or inflation, and did so by expanding its holdings of European government bonds.

But the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which administers the reserves, does not have to mark them to market daily, so it is not clear what effect, if any, the losses will have on Chinese policy.

China's Surprise Tightening Move

Petitioning China

From: http://www.fxsolutions.com/learning-tools/market-directions.asp?file=20091116

By Joseph Trevisani

President Obama’s trip to Asia is one part introduction, one part diplomatic dialogue and eight parts competitive economics. Whatever understandings are reached with leaders of Japan, South Korean or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (APEC) in Singapore, it is the visit to Beijing that matters.

The American President would like China’s cooperation on the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, a more flexible currency policy for the yuan, open trade and continued Chinese purchase of American debt. He is likely to obtain only the last, the price for which will be all the others.

China wants unquestioned sovereignty over Tibet, an uncritical acceptance of its internal political and economic policies and reassurance that the United States will honor its debts, rein in deficit spending and prevent a dollar collapse.

The Beijing rulers received assurance on Tibet when Obama refused to see the exiled Tibetan Dali Lama. The frequent American criticism of China's trade policies and human rights issues has become much more muted in the past eleven months. This administration has not, as in previous terms, harangued China to open its political and economic system, Treasury Secretary Geithner’s ‘manipulated yuan’ comment before the Senate Finance Committee notwithstanding.

The trade-off will come between the competitive economic agendas of China and the United States. The terms of this agreement have already been set; the China trip simply makes the new status quo plain for all to see.

President Obama will reassure President Hu that Washington takes its debt obligations seriously, that it is about to become serious about controlling Federal spending and that it holds to a strong dollar policy. President Hu will promise not to withdraw Chinese support from the Treasury market. The Chinese will pretend to believe the Americans and the Americans will not press them on any other topic.

The price for China’s continued support of the US debt market and by extension of the administration’s domestic agenda is American acquiescence in all international topics of importance to China. For the Chinese it is an excellent trade, a chance to neuter its greatest international adversary for the price of an investment it would probably have to make anyway. The basic fact of the trade is that China feels it has choices and the United States fears it does not. As long as Chinese withdrawal from the US debt market is more frightening to Washington than to Beijing China will have the upper hand in this relationship.

The Chinese currency policy does not just affect its trade with the United States. Because the yuan has been essentially fixed against the dollar since last summer it has depreciated against all other currencies as the dollar has fallen. Terms of trade have worsened for Europe, South Korean, Japan, Taiwan and all of China’s trading partners. Asian central banks have had to spend billions of reserves defending the dollar against their own currencies lest the appreciation become detrimental to their economies. Though the recession has been less severe in Asia it has not skipped the region. World trade has had a larger percentage drop than the fall in GDP of any individual national economy; the economies that depend most heavily on exports have suffered the most. It does not help that the currency markets have long participated in the positive speculative view of Asian currencies against the dollar.

China’s position as the chief and most important creditor of the United States gives it an influence in the world economy much greater than its relatively fragile political and economic strength warrants. Only the United States has the economic, political and military weight to challenge the Beijing Government’s economic and trade policies. But US opposition is hamstrung by its need to petition the Chinese for more and more money. Absent the United States as the natural leader of nations demanding better trade policies from Beijing, the Chinese will be able to sustain and extend trade and currency policies that are beneficial to her but far less so to the rest of the world.

Beijing’s understanding of the terms of trade that are best for the Chinese economy is encapsulated by its yuan policy. In the long run a currency program that beggars its neighbors does not do China, its trading partners or the world economy any good. After all someone, someplace has to buy Chinese products. Stable economic development for China, as for all others, depends on a domestic economy that absorbs a large portion of the national production. But, at least for now, China’s rulers have decided that they can obtain a better deal in the global marketplace than would have been possible when the opposition to her trade policies was led by the United States and backed by many of China's trading partners.

President Obama’s visit to Beijing is an acknowledgement of this new status quo in the world economy. China will set the terms of her trade for the world until the United States regains control of its budget.

Why Stronger Chinese Yuan Would Benefit US Investors

Why Stronger Chinese Yuan Would Benefit US Investors

MARKET, STOCK MARKET, CHINA, CURRENCIES, YUAN, ECONOMY, GLOBAL ECONOMY, INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Posted By: Jeff Cox | CNBC.com | 11 Nov 2009 | 07:23 PM ET

A stronger Chinese currency, which the nation's government indicated could happen in the months ahead, would come at an ideal time for US markets.

As the US economy continues its sluggish recovery, a stronger Chinese yuan would help bolster US exports while offsetting the Federal Reserve's expected increase in interest rates next year, in part to support the weakening dollar.

While it remains uncertain whether China actually will follow through on hints this week that it will let the yuan rise against the dollar, the fact that Beijing is addressing the issue is reason for optimism in the West.

"It would be bullish for everybody but China, really, because it means you'd have better exports and better growth in the Europe and US," says Kurt Karl, chief economist at Swiss Re in New York. "Because it would be stimulative to the economy it would be counteractive to the Fed tightening. It would be wonderful timing if they could do it then, even more helpful if they could do it earlier."

Manufacturers in the US would benefit most because it would make their products cheaper in China and boost their revenue from that country when it is translated back into dollars.

Currency traders could play the move, comfortable that global diplomatic pressure at least would prevent China from allowing the yuan to depreciate any further.

The US also would be able to cut its huge trade deficit with China and narrow its overall current account gap. That would give the US economy a further boost and ease a major political headache for the Obama administration just as the president prepares to visit Beijing next week.

"Very often in a diplomatic leadup to a presidential visit you will try to assuage the high-level visitor on the issues that are really important," says Quincy Krosby, general strategist at Prudential Financial. "It's a disarming mechanism. Considering that it's a very important issue for the US and the president, it's not atypical to hear the Chinese bring it up beforehand."

To be sure, there are drawbacks to a stronger yuan.

It could lead to higher prices on the heavy flow of Chinese goods imported to the US, causing inflation and leading the Fed to have to hike interest rates sooner than desired.

Doubts also abound about China's true intentions.

"The Chinese are going to allow their currency to rise vis-a-vis the US dollar when it's in their interest," Krosby says. "They are never going to go ahead and do it if it's in the other countries' interests. That's not the way the Chinese see the world."

Investors, though, need to keep as close an eye on the diplomatic wrangling as will world leaders, who see Chinese monetary policy as one of the lynchpins in preventing a second leg down in the global recession.

If China doesn't follow through and let the yuan rise, that could thwart the run-up in global stocks this year.

Worries About Global Growth

The Treasury Department said in a recent report that China was stockpiling foreign exchange reserves—effectively boosting their value—at a pace that threatened the global economy.

At the same time, the Group of 20, of which the US is a member, continues to rail against China's continued intervention to keep its currency low against the dollar, a policy that has been critical to maintaining its export pace.

"Next year that will be the central focus of global economies," says Bryan Rich, currency analyst at Weiss Research. "The intensity of this fight is going to increase. Do I think China does anything about it? I don't think so."

In the meantime, Rich says investors can take advantage of likely scenarios by investing in the yuan, which has little downside room left.

One way to take advantage is through the WisdomTree Dreyfus Chinese Yuan exchange-traded fund that seeks to replicate money market moves in China and changes in the yuan against the dollar. The ETF is only about 18 months old and somewhat lightly traded but had reached about five times its average daily volume by mid-day Wednesday.

There will be some key incentives for the Chinese to begin backing their currency.

For one, the nation's economy has been on a tear, and tighter monetary policy could be a necessity to control inflation. The World Bank predicts Chinese gross domestic product to hit 8.7 percent in 2010, ahead of previous forecasts.

Also, the Fed is likely at some point to have to start raising its key lending rate, which in turn will boost the US dollar. The strengthening of the greenback would give China some breathing room to boost the yuan.

"If the Fed starts tightening that would make it easier for those guys to do it because then the dollar would be a little stronger," says Uri Landesman, head of global growth strategy for ING Investment Management in New York. "They may wait until the Fed tightens. The question is, when does the Fed tighten?

"I don't think there's any way on God's green earth that they're tightening while there is a 10 in front of the unemployment number."

Still, there will be tremendous pressure on China to make at least some move on its currency, both from within its own economic policy advisers and from the outside world, where international leaders are tired of seeing their exports usurped by the weak yuan.

"At some point the US dollar will rise organically on the back of more and more positive US economic news," Krosby says. "That's going to push the dollar higher as the currency markets believe the Fed will get closer to removing the (tightening) language. That will be the first step and an ultimate tightening will take place. We're not close to that."

As such, investors will have to hope that global diplomatic pressure does the trick.

"Throughout this terrible crisis the Chinese were able to grow their economy and keep it growing at a pretty rapid clip, so it's still very much a command economy," Swiss Re's Karl says. "I don't see (the yuan appreciating) until late next year. They're very keen on keeping their economy growing."

Harr on Asian Currencies