2011/03/08
2010/05/27
The grasshoppers and the ants – a modern fable
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/202ed286-6832-11df-a52f-00144feab49a.html
Everybody in the west knows the fable of the grasshopper and the ant. The grasshopper is lazy and sings away the summer, while the ant piles up stores for the winter. When the cold weather comes, the grasshopper begs the ant for food. The ant refuses and the grasshopper starves. The moral of this story? Idleness brings want.
Yet life is more complex than in Aesop’s fable. Today, the ants are Germans, Chinese and Japanese, while the grasshoppers are American, British, Greek, Irish and Spanish. Ants produce enticing goods grasshoppers want to buy. The latter ask whether the former want something in return. “No,” reply the ants. “You do not have anything we want, except, maybe, a spot by the sea. We will lend you the money. That way, you enjoy our goods and we accumulate stores.”
Ants and grasshoppers are happy. Being frugal and cautious, the ants deposit their surplus earnings in supposedly safe banks, which relend to grasshoppers. The latter, in turn, no longer need to make goods, since ants supply them so cheaply. But ants do not sell them houses, shopping malls or offices. So grasshoppers make these, instead. They even ask ants to come and do the work. Grasshoppers find that with all the money flowing in, the price of land rises. So they borrow more, build more and spend more.
The ants look at the prosperity of grasshopper colonies and tell their bankers: “Lend even more to grasshoppers, since we ants do not want to borrow.” Ants are far better at making real products than at assessing financial ones. So grasshoppers discover clever ways of packaging their grasshopper loans into enticing assets for ant banks.
Now, the German ant nest is very close to some small colonies of grasshoppers. German ants say: “We want to be friends. So why do we not all use the same money? But, first, you must promise to behave like ants forever.” So grasshoppers have to pass a test: behave like ants for a few years. The grasshoppers do so and are then allowed to adopt the European money.
Everyone lives happily, for a while. The German ants look at their loans to grasshoppers and feel rich. Meanwhile, in grasshopper colonies, their governments look at their healthy accounts and say: “Look, we are better at sticking to the fiscal rules than ants.” Ants find this embarrassing. So they say nothing about the fact that wages and prices are rising fast in grasshopper colonies, making their goods more expensive, while lowering the real burden of interest, so encouraging yet more borrowing and building.
Wise German ants insist, gloomily, that “trees do not grow to the sky”. Land prices finally peak in the grasshopper colonies. Ant banks duly become nervous and ask for their money back. So grasshopper debtors are forced to sell. This creates a chain of bankruptcy. It also halts construction in the grasshopper colonies and grasshopper spending on ant goods. Jobs disappear in both grasshopper colonies and ant nests and fiscal deficits soar, especially in grasshopper colonies.
German ants realise that their stores of wealth are not worth much since grasshoppers cannot provide them with anything they want, except for cheap houses in the sun. Ant banks either have to write off bad loans or they must persuade ant governments to give even more ant money to the grasshopper colonies. Ant governments are afraid to admit that they have allowed their banks to lose the ants’ money. So they prefer the latter course, called a “bail-out”. Meanwhile, they order the governments of the grasshoppers to raise taxes and slash spending. Now, they say, you must really behave like ants. So the grasshopper colonies go into a deep recession. But grasshoppers still cannot make anything ants want to buy, because they do not know how to do so. Since grasshoppers can no longer borrow, to buy goods from ants, they starve. The German ants finally write off their loans to grasshoppers. But, having learnt little from this experience, they sell their goods, in return for yet more debt, elsewhere.
As it happens, in the wider world, there are other ant nests. Asia, in particular, is full of them. There is a rich nest, rather like Germany, called Japan. There is also a huge, but poorer, nest called China. These also want to become rich by selling goods to grasshoppers at low prices and building up claims on grasshopper colonies. The Chinese nest even fixes the foreign price of its currency at a level that guarantees the extreme cheapness of its goods. Fortunately, for the Asians, or so it seems, there happens to be a very big and exceptionally industrious grasshopper colony, called America. Indeed, the only way you would know it is a grasshopper colony is that its motto is: “In shopping we trust”. Asian nests develop a relationship with America similar to Germany’s with its neighbours. Asian ants build up piles of grasshopper debt and feel rich.
Yet there is a difference. When the crash comes to America and households stop borrowing and spending and the fiscal deficit explodes, the government does not say to itself: “This is dangerous; we must cut back spending.” Instead, it says: “We must spend even more, to keep the economy humming.” So the fiscal deficit becomes enormous.
This makes the Asians nervous. So the leader of China’s nest tells America: “We, your creditors, insist you stop borrowing, just as European grasshoppers are now doing.” The leader of the American colony laughs: “We did not ask you to lend us this money. In fact, we told you it was a folly. We are going to make sure American grasshoppers have jobs. If you do not want to lend us money, raise the price of your currency. Then we will make what we used to buy and you will no longer have to lend to us.” So America teaches creditors a lesson from a dead sage: “If you owe your bank $100, you have a problem; but if you owe $100m, it does.”
The Chinese leader does not want to admit that his nest’s huge pile of American debt is not going to be worth what it cost. Chinese people also want to go on making cheap goods for foreigners. So China decides to buy yet more American debt, after all. But, decades later, the Chinese finally say to the Americans: “Now we would like you to provide us with goods in return for your debt to us. Thereupon, the American grasshoppers laugh and promptly reduce the debt’s value. The ants lose the value off their savings and some of them then starve to death.
What is the moral of this fable? If you want to accumulate enduring wealth, do not lend to grasshoppers.
2010/02/17
The Ring of Fire
Investment management is a privileged profession – not just for being paid by X-times what you’re really worth to society, but from the standpoint of longevity. If you’re good, and you at least give the impression that you still have most of your faculties, you can literally hang around forever. James Carville, the well-meaning but evil-lookin’ guy from the Clinton Administration once remarked that in his next life he’d like to come back as a bond manager. He had part of it right – the influence, the wealth, and even fame – but there was no need to imagine himself as some cryogenically preserved Wall Street version of Ted Williams – he was young enough at the time to make the leap and still have a 20-year career ahead of him. Other professions do not afford such opportunities – the gold watch at 65 is not only symbolic, but a statement in most professions that says you are more or less washed up. Athletes have at most 20 years and musicians seem to have that brief window of creation as well. The Beatles, for instance, were done after a decade’s time. Paul is still writing songs, but the magic clearly disappeared in the 70s and now his concerts are “garden parties” of remembrances as opposed to creation. What I think is close to unique about investment management is that it’s really about the stewardship of capital markets, and that time weeds out the impostors, leaving the aging survivors to appear as wise and capable of guiding clients through the next crisis – whatever and whenever it might appear. That assumption has some logic behind it, but critically depends on the investor truly enjoying the game and – of course – holding on to at least a few billion brain cells that keeps him from being obviously senile or at least being accused of having “lost it.” An investment manager at 65 fears both. I remember having met John Templeton on the set of Wall Street Week nearly 20 years ago. I was a young buck and he was – well – on the downside of his career. About the only thing he could tell Rukeyser, it seemed to me, was to cite the rule of 72 and proclaim that stocks and the Dow would be at 100,000 by 2030 or something like that. Now, approaching that same age, I’m a little more understanding and a little less young-buckish. If that was his only lesson, then it was a pretty good one I suppose – Dow 5,000 and the New Normal notwithstanding. And despite the strikingly premature departure of Peter Lynch and the transition of George Soros to philanthropic pursuits, there are some great examples of longevity in this business. Warren Buffett, of course, comes immediately to mind, as does Dan Fuss of Loomis Sayles, who may wind up as the Bear Bryant or Adolph Rupp of the bond business. Peter Bernstein, who passed away but a few months ago, was a brilliant writer and commentator on the investment scene well into his 80s. So there’s hope for you still, James Carville, and, I suppose, for me as well. It’s quite a privilege to be a “steward of the capital markets,” to have done it well for so long and to still be able to walk up to the plate and face a 95-mile-an-hour fastball. Or, is it a curve? Time will tell. There have been numerous changeups and curveballs in the financial markets over the past 15 months or so. Liquidation, reliquification, and the substituting of the government wallet for the invisible hand of the private sector describe the events from 30,000 feet. Now that a semblance of stability has been imparted to the economy and its markets, the attempted detoxification and deleveraging of the private sector is underway. Having survived due to a steady two-trillion-dollar-plus dose of government “Red Bull,” Adderall, or simply strong black coffee, the global private sector is now expected by some to detox and resume a normal cyclical schedule where animal spirits and the willingness to take risk move front and center. But there is a problem. While corporations may be heading in that direction due to steep yield curves and government check writing that have partially repaired their balance sheets, their consumer customers remain fully levered and undercapitalized with little hope of escaping rehab as long as unemployment and underemployment remain at 10-20% levels worldwide. “Build it and they will come” is an old saw more applicable to Kevin Costner’s Field of Dreams than to today’s economy. “Say’s Law” proclaiming that supply creates its own demand is hardly applicable to a modern day credit-oriented society where credit cards are maxed out, 25% of homeowners are underwater, and job and income creation are nearly invisible. In this New Normal environment it is instructive to observe that the operative word is “new” and that the use of historical models and econometric forecasting based on the experience of the past several decades may not only be useless, but counterproductive. When leveraging and deregulating not only slow down, but move into reverse gear encompassing deleveraging and reregulating, then it pays to look at historical examples where those conditions have prevailed. Two excellent studies provide assistance in that regard – the first, a study of eight centuries of financial crisis by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff titled This Time is Different, and the second, a study by the McKinsey Global Institute speaking to “Debt and deleveraging: The global credit bubble and its economic consequences.” The Reinhart/Rogoff book speaks primarily to public debt that balloons in response to financial crises. It is a voluminous, somewhat academic production but it has numerous critical conclusions gleaned from an analysis of centuries of creditor/sovereign debt cycles. It states: Their conclusions are eerily parallel to events of the past 12 months and suggest that PIMCO’s New Normal may as well be described as the “time-tested historical reliable.” These examples tend to confirm that banking crises are followed by a deleveraging of the private sector accompanied by a substitution and escalation of government debt, which in turn slows economic growth and (PIMCO’s thesis) lowers returns on investment and financial assets. The most vulnerable countries in 2010 are shown in PIMCO’s chart “The Ring of Fire.” These red zone countries are ones with the potential for public debt to exceed 90% of GDP within a few years’ time, which would slow GDP by 1% or more. The yellow and green areas are considered to be the most conservative and potentially most solvent, with the potential for higher growth. A different study by the McKinsey Group analyzes current leverage in the total economy (household, corporate and government debt) and looks to history, finding 32 examples of sustained deleveraging in the aftermath of a financial crisis. It concludes: Initial conditions are important because the ability of a country to respond to a financial crisis is related to the size of its existing debt burden and because it points to future financing potential. Is it any wonder that in this New Normal, China, India, Brazil and other developing economies have fared far better than G-7 stalwarts? PIMCO’s New Normal distinguishes between emerging and developed economic growth, forecasting a much better future for the former as opposed to the latter. Chart 3 displays a startling recent historical and IMF future forecast for government debt levels of developed and developing countries. “Escalating” might be a conservative future description for advanced countries. “Stable” might now be more applicable to many emerging sovereigns. What then is an investor to do? If, instead of econometric models founded on the past 30–40 years, an analysis must depend on centuries-old examples of deleveraging economies in the aftermath of a financial crisis, how does one select and then time an investment theme that can be expected to generate outperformance, or what professionals label “alpha?” Carefully and cautiously with regard to timing, I suppose, but rather aggressively in the selection process under the assumption that it’s never “different this time” and that history repeats as well as rhymes. Reinhart and Rogoff’s book, if anything, points to the inescapable conclusion that human nature is the one defining constant in history and that the cycles of greed, fear and their economic consequences paint an indelible landscape for investors to observe. If so, then investors should focus on the following 30,000-foot observations in the selection of global assets: Of all of the developed countries, three broad fixed-income observations stand out: 1) given enough liquidity and current yields I would prefer to invest money in Canada. Its conservative banks never did participate in the housing crisis and it moved toward and stayed closer to fiscal balance than any other country, 2) Germany is the safest, most liquid sovereign alternative, although its leadership and the EU’s potential stance toward bailouts of Greece and Ireland must be watched. Think AIG and GMAC and you have a similar comparative predicament, and 3) the U.K. is a must to avoid. Its Gilts are resting on a bed of nitroglycerine. High debt with the potential to devalue its currency present high risks for bond investors. In addition, its interest rates are already artificially influenced by accounting standards that at one point last year produced long-term real interest rates of 1/2 % and lower. The last decade – the “aughts” – were remarkable in a number of areas: jobless recoveries in major economies, negative equity returns in U.S. and other developed markets, and of course the financial crisis and its aftermath. If an investment manager and an investment management firm proved to be good stewards of capital markets during the turbulent but vapid “aughts,” they may be granted a license to navigate the rapids of the “teens,” a decade likely to be fed by the melting snows of debt deleveraging, offering life for unlevered emerging and developed economies, but risk and uncertainty for those overfed on a diet of financed-based consumption. Beware the ring of fire! William H. Gross
Managing Director
2010/01/20
2009/12/30
A dose of double-digit inflation might be wishful thinking
Throughout this crisis, one simple refrain has kept echoing again and again in my head: they’ll inflate it all away.
When you consider the size of the debt the Government is faced with, and the fact that historically governments have often chosen to debauch their currency rather than directly defaulting, it is tempting to conclude that, in a few years’ time, we will face a massive dose of purposefully-generated inflation as the Government tries to reduce debts rather than taking the slightly more painful route of cutting spending and raising taxes. It’s probably fair to say from having read your comments that most of you think likewise.
But can they actually manage it? This was the question I tried to tackle in my column this week. My feeling is that if the Government felt it could get away with it, it would generate bumper inflation – double digits if necessary. The problem, I discovered, is that the way its UK liabilities have evolved means that whereas this might have worked at eroding away the debt in the 1970s, it would not today: four-fifths of the UK Government liabilities (on and off balance sheet) are inflation-proof. I don’t know whether people, in the market or even the Government, fully appreciate this.
Now, such an obstacle could be overcome, but only by rewriting various contracts. In rising order of difficulty, you’d have to remove the inflation-link built into the state pension (or, more feasibly, raise the retirement age faster and so erode the eventual liabilities). You could cut public sector pension payouts for existing state workers. You could rip up the terms on the private finance initiative so they are not inflation-protected. You could do the same with index-linked gilts. Another possibility suggested by my colleague Jeremy Warner is that perhaps the Bank of England could simply cancel the gilts sitting in its vaults as a result of quantitative easing – outright monetisation of the deficit.
The problem is that doing all of this is significantly closer to outright default than the rather more subtle, insidious method of just inflating away the debt itself.
I should add that none of the above is something I would recommend – in fact some of it is outright horrifying. However, we ought, pragmatically, to be aware of the restraints facing the Government, and try to anticipate the ways that it might try to tackle the deficit, if it is too cowardly to slash the deficit Ireland-style. To my mind, fiscal consolidation (alongside relatively loose monetary policy) is the answer. But the Government should be getting on with it quicker or else we will have to face the unholy trinity of rising interest rates, rising taxes and falling spending all at once.
PS I know that some of you have, to put it lightly, disagreed with the policy of quantitative easing, a policy I’ve been supportive of right from the start. Contrary to some other commentators, I don’t believe that QE, as it has been carried out so far, has been covertly designed to try to generate the kind of debt-destructive inflation I’ve talked about above. Insofar as it has had an inflationary effect, it has only counteracted the immense deflation generated by the worldwide economic crisis.
This is very similar to what happened in the 1930s. America deflated (facing the depression as it stuck within the gold standard); Britain inflated. Except that this wasn’t 70s style inflation, it was merely the avoidance of an outright debt deflation spiral. This is a critical difference.
But supporting the policy so far doesn’t imply supporting it until kingdom come. The moment there is any hint that the Government is attempting outright to monetise the deficit (Mugabe-style), be assured we will be on it like a nasty rash.
2009/11/19
Stating the Obvious: Why the Stock Market Should Crash
http://www.oftwominds.com/blognov09/market-should-crash11-09.html
By Charles Smith
The trillions squandered on "stabilization" is not leading to "recovery" of the real economy; it is only life support keeping a sick economy from imploding. The stock market rally rests on rapidly crumbling sand. I'm not saying the stock market will crash, only that if it had any relation to the real U.S. economy that it should crash, and soon. The current politics of experience (a key concept in Survival+) is so warped by misleading statistics and orchestrated propaganda that it feels strange to state the obvious and find it is "that which cannot be spoken": the credit-dependent, consumer-dependent U.S. economy is going down, and going down hard, and the trillions of dollars borrowed and spent by the U.S. government and Federal Reserve to crank up a recovery have failed completely, utterly and totally. The basic idea of Keynesian policy is simple: when the wheels fall off the private, quasi-free enterprise economy, then the government borrows and spreads mountains of money around like fertilizer which will stimulate "green shoots" of recovery. The forgotten key to successful Keynesian policy is a government which has not been borrowing and spending trillions of dollars even during an era of so-called "prosperity." When a government like the U.S. has been propping up "prosperity" with trillions in borrowed money for a decade, then doubling or tripling the "stimulus" in the hopes that the green shoots will be enduring is truly farcical. If the economy needed several trillion dollars in deficit spending to eke out the meager jobless growth of 2001-2007, then why does anyone think that doubling or tripling that deficit spending will create an enduring boom? The truth is the U.S. economy has been dependent on Federal stimulus for years, both the indirect stimulus of artificially low interest rates and unlimited liquidity, and the direct spending of hundreds of billions of borrowed dollars. Even before the financial crisis, the Federal government was borrowing and spending $400 billion a year to prop up "prosperity." All that spending simply papered over the rot at the core of the economy: 1. The primary support of the U.S. economy is consumer spending which is ultimately based on household income and assets. Earned income has been flat to down for most Americans for years. The median income has been skewed upwards by the top 10% whose earnings have risen significantly. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, real disposable personal income-- income adjusted for inflation and taxes--declined 3.4 percent in the third quarter after increasing 3.8 percent in the second quarter. In an economy dependent on consumer spending for 70% of GDP, how can GDP rise by 3.5% while personal income plummeted by 3.4%? Assuming that boost in GDP is real and not just statistical legerdemain, then where did it come from? From borrowed money, of course-- the Federal government borrowed and spent over $1.4 trillion in fiscal 2009. In the good old days of 2002-2007, households would have borrowed and spent hundreds of billions as well. But the consumer, beset by declining assets ($13 trillion lost in the past two years), declining income (see above), falling housing values and worrisome employment trends (17% unemployment/underemployment, broadly measured), is actually cutting back on borrowing: Revolving Consumer Credit Drops 13.1% in August. Consumer credit decreased at an annual rate of 5-3/4 percent in August 2009. Revolving credit (credit cards) decreased at an annual rate of 13 percent, and nonrevolving credit decreased at an annual rate of 1-1/2 percent--the longest decline in consumer debt since 1991. So while households are still burdened with almost $2.5 trillion credit card and nonrevolving debt (auto loans, etc.), they are paying debt down, not adding more. And let's not forget that homeowners pulled out about $5 trillion in home equity in 2001-2007, and the home equity ATM is closed for good. That brings us to: 2. The primary asset in most U.S. households is a home, and home values are still dropping, foreclosures are still rising and the only force keeping the market from falling faster is the Federal government's defacto nationalization of the entire U.S. mortgage market. Of the $1.5 trillion mortgage securities issued in 2009, a mere 1% ($15 billion) have been issued by banks 99% are backed by the government. The government owns over half the nation's $10 trillion in mortgages via its defacto ownership of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and it has guaranteed virtually all the mortgages originated in the past year via FHA or VA. The residential mortgage market is now effectively owned lock, stock and barrel by the Federal government and its private "central bank", the Federal Reserve. Should the Fed and Treasury reduce their subsidies (that wonderful $8,000 giveaway tax credit to new home buyers or anyone claiming to be one), guarantees and outright purchases of mortgages ($1.2 trillion this year alone), then the mortgage market would instantly freeze up or start pricing in the very real risk that housing is not "recovering" and that anyone holding a mortgage could suffer huge losses if real estate continues declining in value. Here are a few charts to ponder: Credit Creaks into Gear: With a big boost from the feds, investors again like securities backed by assets like car loans—but it'll take years for lending to flow freely. Cracks in the Foundation of the Fed's Housing Fix A Wall Street power broker worries about what happens when government aid ends Foreclosures Continue to Put a Damper on Home Prices. 3. So how have companies "surprised" with higher profits? By slashing payrolls, R&D and various accounting tricks. Actual revenue growth is missing in action. So how do you keep "surprising to the upside" after you've slashed headcount, burned R&D and turned every accounting trick in the book? The GDP Mirage By overlooking cuts in research and development, product design, and worker training, GDP is greatly overstating the economy's strength You don't. A stock market rising on the hopes of an actual, real, tangible recovery in household income, home equity and creditworthiness is seeing mirages and hallucinating that the lake just ahead is deep and wonderful and stretches to the horizon. Only we never reach the "lake," do we? "Stabilization" is a chimera; the reality is the government is propping up the economy via unprecedented borrowing and spending, and there is absolutely no evidence that private capital, credit or spending are rising from the "stabilization." We are walking through the desert, kept alive by the sugar-water drip of Federal stimulus, guarantees and subsidies. The "so near, yet so far" mirage of "recovery" has been propping up the stock market for nine months, and when a slight breeze blows away the thermal illusion, then the market will crash back to the March lows, or perhaps even lower. That crash will simply reflect the state of the real economy. 
2009/11/08
Everything you need to know about the economy in four pictures
Time for some chart-porn. A few interesting charts that can tell you far more about the economy than all of my yaddering. Two themes today: economic recovery and printing money
Economic recovery
This first one is courtesy of Paul Krugman - the story of the crisis in one picture.
The lines represent world industrial production – the blue being in the 1930s and the red the current trajectory. The story is clear: the opening months of this crisis were as bad, if not worse, than the Great Depression in terms of the collapse of economic activity (for which ind production is a pretty good proxy). Since then, the massive injection of stimulus from central banks and from governments all around the world has helped arrest that decline. Of course, it’s far too early to sit back and relax. I fear there could be a further dip in the future as the stimulus wears off, or is reversed, but it is reassuring that, throughout the world, the plan is having at least some success.
Except, it seems in Britain, at least according to this chart from the National Institute for Economic and Social Research.
This is the path of Britain’s economic output throughout this crisis, compared with previous recessions. As you can see, NIESR’s latest calculations, which take into account UK performance in October, show we’re still sinking deeper. In fact, they calculate that this is now a deeper recession than in the 1980s (at over 6pc peak to trough contraction). Why has the UK suffered so much? Oh, the usual reasons: over-reliance on the City (not to meantion North Sea oil revenues, as I wrote in my column this morning); over-borrowing by the Government before the crisis; over-borrowing by consumers; a company fundraising system that relied too much on borrowing directly from banks rather than the bond market etc etc…
Printing Money
As we all know, the Bank of England is creating money (it doesn’t like to call it “printing” but the net result is the same) like gangbusters. This morning it committed to creating a further £200bn of the stuff. Now, what alarms many of you, and rightly so, is the fact that it is using this money to buy Government debt. After all, as I write in my comment piece for the newspaper, it raises suspicions that it is considering monetising the deficit (printing money to fund government borrowing – what the Weimar did in the 1920s and Mugabe in the 2000s). I still believe intently that this is not the intention here in the UK (at least not yet) but it is alarming that whereas the other major central banks – the Fed in particular – have printed money to buy private debt, we in the UK have printed it to buy gilts. This chart from the IMF (report here – pdf) tells the whole story.
Click on it to expand it.
The blue bits are government debt. Why on earth does the Bank find it impossible to buy anything other than gilts when others have no problem at all? It’s a real concern.
Finally, here is an excellent chart documenting the consequences of QE. This is what happened in the early 19th century when the British Government embarked on an ill-advised attempt to print money and sever the link between money and gold. The result was inflation of well over 30pc and a series of future crisis.
The chart is from George Trefgarne’s excellent investigation into QE for the Centre for Policy Studies, which I would thoroughly recommend you all check out. It is the only account I’ve seen that properly unravels the consequences of Britain’s previous experiments with QE. Two of the three episodes ended in nasty and sticky inflation. Oh dear. But even in spite of that it might surprise you to learn that Trefgarne, my predecessor as economics editor here, is actually in favour of the policy (though not willingly but with his nose pegged.)
2009/10/31
Liquor before Beer... In the Clear
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21309823/David-Einhorn-Speech-to-Value-Investors
Value Investing Congress
David Einhorn, Greenlight Capital, "Liquor before Beer... In the Clear"
October 19, 2009
One of the nice aspects of trying to solve investment puzzles is recognizing that even though I am not always going to be right, I don't have to be. Decent portfolio management allows for some bad luck and some bad decisions. When something does go wrong, I like to think about the bad decisions and learn from them so that hopefully I don't repeat the same mistakes. This leaves me plenty of room to make fresh mistakes going forward. I'd like to start today by reviewing a bad decision I made and share with you what I've learned from that error and how I am attempting to apply the lessons to improve our funds' prospects.
At the May 2005 Ira Sohn Investment Research Conference in New York, I recommended MDC Holdings, a homebuilder, at $67 per share. Two months later MDC reached $89 a share, a nice quick return if you timed your sale perfectly. Then the stock collapsed with the rest of the sector. Some of my MDC analysis was correct: it was less risky than its peers and would hold-up better in a down cycle because it had less leverage and held less land. But this just meant that almost half a decade later, anyone who listened to me would have lost about forty percent of his investment, instead of the seventy percent that the homebuilding sector lost.
I want to revisit this because the loss was not bad luck; it was bad analysis. I down played the importance of what was then an ongoing housing bubble. On the very same day, at the very same conference, a more experienced and wiser investor, Stanley Druckenmiller, explained in gory detail the big picture problem the country faced from a growing housing bubble fueled by a growing debt bubble. At the time, I wondered whether even if he were correct, would it be possible to convert such big picture macro-thinking into successful portfolio management? I thought this was particularly tricky since getting both the timing of big macro changes as well as the market's recognition of them correct has proven at best a difficult proposition. Smart investors had been complaining about the housing bubble since at least 2001. I ignored Stan, rationalizing that even if he were right, there was no way to know when he would be right. This was an expensive error.
The lesson that I have learned is that it isn't reasonable to be agnostic about the big picture. For years I had believed that I didn't need to take a view on the market or the economy because I considered myself to be a "bottom up" investor. Having my eyes open to the big picture doesn't mean abandoning stock picking, but it does mean managing the long-short exposure ratio more actively, worrying about what may be brewing in certain industries, and when appropriate, buying some just-in-case insurance for foreseeable macro risks even if they are hard to time. In a few minutes, I will tell you what Greenlight has done along these lines.
But first, I'd like to explain what I see as the macro risks we face. To do that I need to digress into some political science. Please humor me since my mom and dad spent a lot of money so I could be a government major, the usefulness of which has not been apparent for some time.
Winston Churchill said that, "Democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others that have been tried from time to time."
As I see it, there are two basic problems in how we have designed our government. The first is that officials favor policies with short-term impact over those in our long-term interest because they need to be popular while they are in office and they want to be re-elected. In recent times, opinion tracking polls, the immediate reactions of focus groups, the 24/7 news cycle, the constant campaign, and the moment-to-moment obsession with the Dow Jones Industrial Average have magnified the political pressures to favor short-term solutions. Earlier this year, the political topic du jour was to debate whether the stimulus was working, before it had even been spent.
Paul Volcker was an unusual public official because he was willing to make unpopular decisions in the early '80s and was disliked at the time. History, though, judges him kindly for the era of prosperity that followed.
Presently, Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner have become the quintessential short-term decision makers. They explicitly "do whatever it takes" to "solve one problem at a time" and deal with the unintended consequences later. It is too soon for history to evaluate their work, because there hasn't been time for the unintended consequences of the "do whatever it takes" decision-making to materialize.
The second weakness in our government is "concentrated benefit versus diffuse harm" also known as the problem of special interests. Decision makers help small groups who care about narrow issues and whose "special interests" invest substantial resources to be better heard through lobbying, public relations and campaign support. The special interests benefit while the associated costs and consequences are spread broadly through the rest of the population. With individuals bearing a comparatively small extra burden, they are less motivated or able to fight in Washington.
In the context of the recent economic crisis, a highly motivated and organized banking lobby has demonstrated enormous influence. Bankers advance ideas like, "without banks, we would have no economy." Of course, there was a public interest in protecting the guts of the system, but the ATMs could have continued working, even with forced debt-to-equity conversions that would not have required any public funds. Instead, our leaders responded by handing over hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to protect the speculative investments of bank shareholders and creditors. This has been particularly remarkable, considering that most agree that these same banks had an enormous role in creating this mess which has thrown millions out of their homes and jobs.
Like teenagers with their parents away, financial institutions threw a wild party that eventually tore-up the neighborhood. With their charge arrested and put in jail to detoxify, the supervisors were faced with a decision: Do we let the party goers learn a tough lesson or do we bail them out? Different parents with different philosophies might come to different decisions on this point. As you know our regulators went the bail-out route.
But then the question becomes, once you bail them out, what do you do to discipline the misbehavior? Our authorities have taken the response that kids will be kids. "What? You drank beer and then vodka. Are you kidding? Didn't I teach you, beer before liquor, never sicker, liquor before beer, in the clear! Now, get back out there and have a good time." And for the last few months we have seen the beginning of another party, which plays nicely toward government preferences for short-term favorable news-flow while satisfying the banking special interest. It has not done much to repair the damage to the neighborhood.
And the neighbors are angry, because at some level, Americans understand that the Washington-Wall Street relationship has rewarded the least deserving people and institutions at the expense of the prudent. They don't know the particulars or how to argue against the "without banks, we have no economy" demagogues. So, they fight healthcare reform, where they have enough personal experience to equip them to argue with Congressmen at town hall meetings. As I see it, the revolt over healthcare isn't really about healthcare, but represents a broader upset at Washington. The lack of trust over the inability to deal seriously with the party goers feeds the lack of trust over healthcare.
On the anniversary of Lehman's failure, President Obama gave a terrific speech. He said, "Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for the consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break the fall." Later he advocated an end of "too big to fail." Then he added, "For a market to function, those who invest and lend in that market must believe that their money is actually at risk." These are good points that he should run by his policy team, because Secretary Geithner's reform proposal does exactly the opposite.
The financial reform on the table is analogous to our response to airline terrorism by frisking grandma and taking away everyone's shampoo, in that it gives the appearance of officially "doing something" and adds to our bureaucracy without really making anything safer.
With the ensuing government bailout, we have now institutionalized the idea of too-big-to-fail and insulated investors from risk.
The proper way to deal with too-big-to-fail, or too inter-connected to fail, is to make sure that no institution is too big or inter-connected to fail. The test ought to be that no institution should ever be of individual importance such that if we were faced with its demise the government would be forced to intervene. The real solution is to break up anything that fails that test.
The lesson of Lehman should not be that the government should have prevented its failure. The lesson of Lehman should be that Lehman should not have existed at a scale that allowed it to jeopardize the financial system. And the same logic applies to AIG, Fannie, Freddie, Bear Stearns, Citigroup and a couple dozen others.
Twenty-five years ago the government dismantled AT&T. Its break-up set forth decades of unbelievable progress in that industry. We can do that again here in the financial sector and we would achieve very positive social benefit with no cost that anyone can seem to explain.
The proposed reform takes us in the polar opposite direction. The cop-out response from Washington is that it isn't "practical." Our leaders are so influenced by the banking special interests that they would rather declare it "impractical" than roll up their sleeves and figure out how to get the job done.
The bailouts have installed a great deal of moral hazard, which in the absence of radical change will be reinforced and thereby grant every big institution a permanent "implicit" government backstop. This creates an enormous ongoing subsidy for the too-big-to-fails, as well as making it much harder for the non-too-big-to-fails to compete. In effect, we all continue to subsidize the big banks even though we keep hearing the worst of the crisis is behind us.
In addition, the now larger too-big-to-fails are beginning to take advantage of developing oligopolies. Even as the government spends trillions to subsidize mortgage rates, the resulting discount is not being passed to homeowners but is being kept by mortgage originators who are earning record profits per mortgage originated. Recently, Goldman upgraded Wells Fargo partly based on its ability to earn long-term oligopolistic mortgage origination spreads.
The proposed reform does not deal with the serious risks that the recent crisis exposed. Credit Default Swaps, which create large, correlated and asymmetric risks, scared the authorities into spending hundreds of billions of taxpayer money to prevent the speculators who made bad bets from having to pay.
CDS are also highly anti-social. Bondholders who also hold CDS make a bigger return when the issuing firms fail. As a result, holders of so-called "basis packages" - a bond and a CDS - have an incentive to use their position as bondholders to force bankruptcy triggering payment on their CDS, rather than negotiate traditional out of court restructurings or covenant amendments with troubled creditors. Press accounts have noted that this dynamic has contributed to the recent bankruptcies of Abitibi-Bowater, General Growth Properties, Six Flags and even General Motors. They are a pending problem in CIT's efforts to avoid bankruptcy.
The reform proposal to create a CDS clearing house does nothing more than maintain private profits and socialized risks by moving the counter-party risk from the private sector to a newly created too-big-to-fail entity. I think that trying to make safer CDS is like trying to make safer asbestos. How many real businesses have to fail before policy makers decide to simply ban them?
Similarly, the money markets were exposed as creating systemic risk during the crisis. Apparently, investors in these pools of lending assets that carry no reserve for loss expect to be shielded from losing money while earning a higher return than bank deposits or T-bills. Mr. Bernanke decided they needed to be bailed out to save the system. It is hard to imagine why this structure shouldn't be fixed, either by adding them to the FDIC insurance program and subjecting them to bank regulation, or at least forcing them to stop using $1 net-asset values, which gives their customers the impression that they can't fall in value.
The most constructive aspect of the Geithner reform plan is to separate banking from commerce. This would have the effect of forcing industrial companies to divest big finance subsidiaries, which would have to be regulated as banks. During the bubble, companies like GMAC, AIG Financial Products and GE Capital, with cheap funding supported by inaccurate credit ratings, took enormous unregulated risks. When the crisis hit, GMAC and AIG needed huge federal bailouts. The Federal Reserve set up the Commercial Paper Funding Facility to backstop GE Capital among others, and GE became the largest borrower under the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, even though prior to the crisis it wasn't even in the FDIC.
In response to the Geithner proposal, GE immediately let it be known that it had "talked to a number of people in Congress" and it should not have to separate its finance subsidiary because it disingenuously asserted that it hadn't contributed to the crisis. We will see whether the GE special interest is able to stave-off this constructive reform proposal.
Rather than deal with these simple problems with simple, obvious solutions, the official reform plans are complicated, convoluted and designed to only have the veneer of reform while mostly serving the special interests. The complications serve to reduce transparency, preventing the public at large from really seeing the overwhelming influence of the banks in shaping the new regulation.
In dealing with the continued weak economy, our leaders are so determined not to repeat the perceived mistakes of the 1930s that they are risking policies with possibly far worse consequences designed by the same people at the Fed who ran policy with the short-term view that asset bubbles don't matter because the fallout can be managed after they pop. That view created a disaster that required unprecedented intervention for which our leaders congratulated themselves for doing whatever it took to solve. With a sense of mission accomplished, the G-20 proclaimed "it worked."
We are now being told that the most important thing is to not remove the fiscal and monetary support too soon. Christine Romer, a top advisor to the President, argues that we made a great mistake by withdrawing stimulus in 1937.
Just to review, in 1934 GDP grew 17.0%, in 1935 it grew another 11.1%, and in 1936 it grew another 14.3%. Over the period unemployment fell by 30%. That is three years of progress. Apparently, even this would not have been enough to achieve what Larry Summers has called "exit velocity."
Imagine, in our modern market, where we now get economic data on practically a daily basis, living through three years of favorable economic reports and deciding that it would be "premature" to withdraw the stimulus.
An alternative lesson from the double dip the economy took in 1938 is that the GDP created by massive fiscal stimulus is artificial. So whenever it is eventually removed, there will be significant economic fall out. Our choice may be either to maintain large annual deficits until our creditors refuse to finance them or tolerate another leg down in our economy by accepting some measure of fiscal discipline.
This brings me to our present fiscal situation and the current investment puzzle.
Over the next decade the welfare states will come to face severe demographic problems. Baby Boomers have driven the U.S. economy since they were born. It is no coincidence that we experienced an economic boom between 1980 and 2000, as the Boomers reached their peak productive years. The Boomers are now reaching retirement. The Social Security and Medicare commitments to them are astronomical.
When the government calculates its debt and deficit it does so on a cash basis. This means that deficit accounting does not take into account the cost of future promises until the money goes out the door. According to shadowstats.com, if the federal government counted the cost of its future promises, the 2008 deficit was over $5 trillion and total obligations are over $60 trillion. And that was before the crisis.
Over the last couple of years we have adopted a policy of private profits and socialized risks. We are transferring many private obligations onto the national ledger. Although our leaders ought to make some serious choices, they appear too trapped in short-termism and special interests to make them. Taking no action is an action.
In the nearer-term the deficit on a cash basis is about $1.6 trillion or 11% of GDP. President Obama forecasts $1.4 trillion next year, and with an optimistic economic outlook, $9 trillion over the next decade. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research recently published a study that indicated that "by all relevant debt indicators, the U.S. fiscal scenario will soon approximate the economic scenario for countries on the verge of a sovereign debt default."
As we sit here today, the Federal Reserve is propping up the bond market, buying long-dated assets with printed money. It cannot turn around and sell what it has just bought.
There is a basic rule of liquidity. It isn't the same for everyone. If you own 10,000 shares of Greenlight Re, you have a liquid investment. However, if I own 5 million shares it is not liquid to me, because of both the size of the position and the signal my selling would send to the market. For this reason, the Fed cannot sell its Treasuries or Agencies without destroying the market. This means that it will be challenged to shrink the monetary base if inflation actually turns up.
Further, the Federal Open Market Committee members may not recognize inflation when they see it, as looking at inflation solely through the prices of goods and services, while ignoring asset inflation, can lead to a repeat of the last policy error of holding rates too low for too long.
At the same time, the Treasury has dramatically shortened the duration of the government debt. As a result, higher rates become a fiscal issue, not just a monetary one. The Fed could reach the point where it perceives doing whatever it takes requires it to become the buyer of Treasuries of first and last resort.
Japan appears even more vulnerable, because it is even more indebted and its poor demographics are a decade ahead of ours. Japan may already be past the point of no return. When a country cannot reduce its ratio of debt to GDP over any time horizon, it means it can only refinance, but can never repay its debts. Japan has about 190% debt-to-GDP financed at an average cost of less than 2%. Even with the benefit of cheap financing the Japanese deficit is expected to be 10% of GDP this year. At some point, as American homeowners with teaser interest rates have learned, when the market refuses to refinance at cheap rates, problems quickly emerge. Imagine the fiscal impact of the market resetting Japanese borrowing costs to 5%.
Over the last few years, Japanese savers have been willing to finance their government deficit. However, with Japan's population aging, it's likely that the domestic savers will begin using those savings to fund their retirements. The newly elected DPJ party that favors domestic consumption might speed up this development. Should the market re-price Japanese credit risk, it is hard to see how Japan could avoid a government default or hyperinflationary currency death spiral.
The failure of Lehman meant that barring extraordinary measures, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs would have failed as the credit market realized that if the government were willing to permit failures, then the cost of financing such institutions needed to be re-priced so as to invalidate their business models.
I believe there is a real possibility that the collapse of any of the major currencies could have a similar domino effect on re-assessing the credit risk of the other fiat currencies run by countries with structural deficits and large, unfunded commitments to aging populations.
I believe that the conventional view that government bonds should be "risk free" and tied to nominal GDP is at risk of changing. Periodically, high quality corporate bonds have traded at lower yields than sovereign debt. That could happen again.
And, of course, these structural risks are exacerbated by the continued presence of credit rating agencies that inspire false confidence with potentially catastrophic results by over-rating the sovereign debt of the largest countries. There is no reason to believe that the rating agencies will do a better job on sovereign risk than they have done on corporate or structured finance risks.
My firm recently met with a Moody's sovereign risk team covering twenty countries in Asia and the Middle East. They have only four professionals covering the entire region. Moody's does not have a long-term quantitative model that incorporates changes in the population, incomes, expected tax rates, and so forth. They use a short-term outlook - only 12-18 months - to analyze data to assess countries' abilities to finance themselves. Moody's makes five-year medium-term qualitative assessments for each country, but does not appear to do any long-term quantitative or critical work.
Their main role, again, appears to be to tell everyone that things are fine, until a real crisis emerges at which point they will pile-on credit downgrades at the least opportune moment, making a difficult situation even more difficult for the authorities to manage.
I can just envision a future Congressional Hearing so elected officials can blame the rating agencies for blowing it, as the rating agencies respond by blaming Congress.
Now, the question for us as investors is how to manage some of these possible risks. Four years ago I spoke at this conference and said that I favored my Grandma Cookie's investment style of investing in stocks like Nike, IBM, McDonalds and Walgreens over my Grandpa Ben's style of buying gold bullion and gold stocks. He feared the economic ruin of our country through a paper money and deficit driven hyper inflation. I explained how Grandma Cookie had been right for the last thirty years and would probably be right for the next thirty as well. I subscribed to Warren Buffett's old criticism that gold just sits there with no yield and viewed gold's long-term value as difficult to assess.
However, the recent crisis has changed my view. The question can be flipped: how does one know what the dollar is worth given that dollars can be created out of thin air or dropped from helicopters? Just because something hasn't happened, doesn't mean it won't. Yes, we should continue to buy stocks in great companies, but there is room for Grandpa Ben's view as well.
I have seen many people debate whether gold is a bet on inflation or deflation. As I see it, it is neither. Gold does well when monetary and fiscal policies are poor and does poorly when they appear sensible. Gold did very well during the Great Depression when FDR debased the currency. It did well again in the money printing 1970s, but collapsed in response to Paul Volcker's austerity. It ultimately made a bottom around 2001 when the excitement about our future budget surpluses peaked.
Prospectively, gold should do fine unless our leaders implement much greater fiscal and monetary restraint than appears likely. Of course, gold should do very well if there is a sovereign debt default or currency crisis.
A few weeks ago, the Office of Inspector General called out the Treasury Department for misrepresenting the position of the banks last fall. The Treasury's response was an unapologetic expression that amounted to saying that at that point "doing whatever it takes" meant pulling a Colonel Jessup: "YOU CAN'T HANDLE THE TRUTH!" At least we know what we are dealing with.
When I watch Chairman Bernanke, Secretary Geithner and Mr. Summers on TV, read speeches written by the Fed Governors, observe the "stimulus" black hole, and think about our short-termism and lack of fiscal discipline and political will, my instinct is to want to short the dollar. But then I look at the other major currencies. The Euro, the Yen, and the British Pound might be worse. So, I conclude that picking one these currencies is like choosing my favorite dental procedure. And I decide holding gold is better than holding cash, especially now, where both earn no yield.
Along these same lines, we have bought long-dated options on much higher U.S. and Japanese interest rates. The options in Japan are particularly cheap because the historical volatility is so low. I prefer options to simply shorting government bonds, because there remains a possibility of a further government bond rally in response to the economy rolling over again. With options, I can clearly limit how much I am willing to lose, while creating a lot of leverage to a possible rate spiral.
For years, the discussion has been that our deficit spending will pass the costs onto "our grandchildren." I believe that this is no longer the case and that the consequences will be seen during the lifetime of the leaders who have pursued short-term popularity over our solvency. The recent economic crisis and our response has brought forward the eventual reconciliation into a window that is near enough that it makes sense for investors to buy some insurance to protect themselves from a possible systemic event. To slightly modify Alexis de Tocqueville: Events can move from the impossible to the inevitable without ever stopping at the probable.
As investors, we can't change the course of events, but we can attempt to protect capital in the face of foreseeable risks.
Of course, just like MDC, there remains the possibility that I am completely wrong. And, personally, I hope I am. I wonder what Stan Druckenmiller thinks.
2009/10/27
2009/09/25
We still have the same disease
Globe and Mail Update
On anniversary of Lehman collapse, author of The Black Swan can say 'I told you so'
On the anniversary of the spectacular collapse of Lehman Brothers, Nassim Nicholas Taleb is one of those people who can say, "I told you so." For the past decade, he's been warning that the global economy has become far more vulnerable to unpredictable events that can cause vast disruption. He famously foresaw the credit crunch that brought the financial system to its knees.
Mr. Taleb is a Wall Street derivatives trader who became an academic specializing in the study of randomness and probability. In May of 2008 he published The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. It argued that most economists and bankers live in a dangerous fantasy world in which they imagine they can control the future. The book takes its name from the fact that all swans were once believed to be white - until black swans turned up in Australia. He loathes bankers, central bankers, and economists, not necessarily in that order, and thinks that banks should be run like public utilities. "My major hobby is teasing people who take themselves and the quality of their knowledge too seriously," he says. He has advised British Conservative Leader David Cameron, and last week testified before the U.S. Congress on the financial crisis.
Mr. Taleb will speak Tuesday in Toronto to kick off the new season of the Grano lecture series. The theme of this season's series is risk and the next global crisis. Margaret Wente caught up with him on Friday to ask him what (if anything) we've learned.
Margaret Wente: Happy days are here again. The central bankers say the recession is over. The markets are buoyant. Can we relax?
Nassim Taleb: Not at all. Central bankers have no clue. In the first place, the financial crisis was not a black swan. It was perfectly predictable. They ignored the phenomenal buildup in leverage since 1980. They acted like airline pilots who'd never heard of hurricanes.
After finishing The Black Swan, I realized there was a cancer. The cancer was a huge buildup of risk-taking based on the lack of understanding of reality. The second problem is the hidden risk with new financial products. And the third is the interdependence among financial institutions.
MW: But aren't those the very problems we're supposed to be fixing?
MT: They're all still here. Today we still have the same amount of debt, but it belongs to governments. Normally debt would get destroyed and turn to air. Debt is a mistake between lender and borrower, and both should suffer. But the government is socializing all these losses by transforming them into liabilities for your children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren. What is the effect? The doctor has shown up and relieved the patient's symptoms - and transformed the tumour into a metastatic tumour. We still have the same disease. We still have too much debt, too many big banks, too much state sponsorship of risk-taking. And now we have six million more Americans who are unemployed - a lot more than that if you count hidden unemployment.
MW: Are you saying the U.S. shouldn't have done all those bailouts? What was the alternative?
NT: Blood , sweat and tears. A lot of the growth of the past few years was fake growth from debt. So swallow the losses, be dignified and move on. Suck it up. I gather you're not too impressed with the folks in Washington who are handling this crisis.
Ben Bernanke saved nothing! He shouldn't be allowed in Washington. He's like a doctor who misses the metastatic tumour and says the patient is doing very well. The first thing I would tell Chinese officials is, how can you buy U.S. bonds as long as Larry Summers is there? He's a textbook case of overconfidence. Look what happened to Harvard's finances. They took a lot of risk they didn't understand, and it was a disaster. That's the Larry Summers mentality.
MW: You argue that globalization and modern technology have made the world financial system far more fragile than ever before. How?
NT: Globalization and the Web create worldwide mass effects, whether positive or negative. We have planetary fads that cause random variables to have bigger spikes than ever before. Variables that used to move 10 per cent now move 30 per cent. The whole planet can pull its money out on the same day. The Internet is what bankrupted Iceland! You in Canada destroyed things with your BlackBerry.
MW: You also say that competition among big companies is the Achilles heel of capitalism. What do you mean by that?
NT: If you make corporations compete, sometimes the one that appears most fit for survival is really the one that is most exposed to the negative black swan. What happens is that if you make $4 a share but you're betting the ranch, like GE, the analysts will love you. But if you make only $2 a share with no risk on your book, they'll say you're not doing well. All the incentives are perverse.
MW: We here in Canada feel pretty good because our banks are in good shape and we've escaped relatively lightly. What's your take?
NT: That's true. You guys are slightly more insulated than others. But there's no way you can escape the mistakes made by others. They'll just cost you somewhat less. But if we wind up with hyperinflation, Canada will be the best place in the world to be. You've got energy and minerals. You're not overspecialized. You're self-sufficient.
MW: Up here our government is promising we can get rid of our deficit by 2015. Any views on that?
NT: Governments never got projections right before, so why should they now?
MW: So if everyone is still on the wrong track, what's the right track?
NT: My whole idea is to lower risk in society by developing a system that can resist human error, rather than one where human error rules. The first step is to make sure that no financial institution is too big to fail. Next, make sure governments don't favour big companies. Governments should also decrease the role of economists - they're no more reliable than astrologers, and they do more damage.
MW: Now that you've painted such a rosy outlook, do you have any advice on how individuals can guard against losing 40 per cent of their money in this extremely risky world?
NT: My advice is that instead of investing in medium-risk securities, you should put most of your money in very low-risk securities, and a little bit in high-risk securities. Then you might get a good black swan. Also, it's good to have more than one profession, in case your own profession goes out of style. A Wall Street trader who's also a belly dancer will do a lot better than a trader who winds up driving a taxi.
2009/09/14
Rogers and Roubini not Impressed
Jim Rogers: ‘When Somebody Fails, You Let Them Fail’
Roubini: US Economy Facing 'Death by a Thousand Cuts'
